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Bird Gail
Commentary
Trust Termination: Unborn, Living, and
Dead Hands-Too Many Fingers in the
Trust Pie
by GAIL BOREMAN BIRD*
One of the primary advantages of the trust lies in its inherent flexi-
bility. Because the device is essentially so simple-the separation of legal
title from beneficial ownership'-it is adaptable to many circumstances
and has a wide variety of uses, ranging from bankruptcy to family wealth
distribution.2 Indeed, the only limitations of the trust may be those of
the imagination.3 Unless continuing flexibility is built into a particular
trust arrangement, however, the trust may prove rigid and unresponsive
to the changing needs, values, and conditions of the settlor and the peo-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
A.B., 1967, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1974, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law.
This Article was prepared to provide the California Law Revision Commission with back-
ground information for its study of this subject. The opinions, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions contained in the Article are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily represent
or reflect the opinions, conclusions, or recommendations of the California Law Revision
Commission.
1. The modern trust concept had its origins in the use, whereby the owner of property
would transfer it to the "use" of himself or a third person. The early history of the use is
somewhat murky, but it is generally believed that the device had been fully developed by the
thirteenth century. The use accomplished its "manifest destiny" when it became characterized
and enforced as equitable ownership. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW 232 (2d ed. 1898); see also Avery, Role of the Lawyer as Fiduciary, 4 PROB. LAW. 1,
21-22 (Summer 1977) (suggesting that the fiduciary relationship inherent in the modern trust
device greatly antedates the use: "[Tihe fiduciary relationship apparently existed in all of the
antecedents of English law," including the Code of Hammurabi and Roman law).
2. Other purposes for which the trust concept is commonly employed include the mak-
ing of charitable gifts, the administration of retirement and pension plans, and real estate fi-
nancing. According to the Restatement, a trust may be established for any purpose, so long as
not contrary to public policy. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 59 (1959). In Califor-
nia a trust may be created for any purpose for which a contract could be made. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 2220 (West 1954).
3. 1 A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 1, at 4 (3d ed. 1967).
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pie who must live with it, particularly the beneficiaries. The problem is
particularly acute in the context of trusts established for wealth distribu-
tion within the family unit.
Suppose, for example, that a person, moved by the spirit of love and
generosity, establishes a trust to provide for the support and education of
his sole grandchild, then age three. Distributions of income are to com-
mence at age eighteen, and the child is to receive the $100,000 principal
at age thirty. Twenty-five years later, the grandchild apparently is emo-
tionally unstable, dependent on drugs and alcohol. Can the settlor mod-
ify the trust or perhaps revoke it entirely to prevent the corpus from
falling into the hands of the improvident grandchild? Or suppose that
the grandchild is not improvident, but rather is married with two chil-
dren and would like to obtain some or all of the trust principal to
purchase a house. Will the grandchild be able to reach some or all of the
principal before reaching age thirty? Suppose that the grandchild is suf-
fering from a serious illness, and her support and health care needs ex-
ceed the income being generated. Can the trustee invade the principal to
meet these unforeseen expenses?
All of these potential problems could have been anticipated and re-
solved within the trust instrument itself. But suppose the settlor (or his
attorney) was not so farsighted. Can anything be done now? Generally,
once a trust has been established, its terms concerning the trustee's pow-
ers and duties, the identity of the beneficiaries, and the extent of the bene-
ficial interests are fixed and final.4 On occasion, however, as the
preceding examples illustrate, a question may arise as to the possibility of
allowing a premature termination, in whole or in part, of a particular
trust. The answer to this question depends upon a wide range of factors:
is the settlor still alive; did he retain a power of revocation; what was his
predominant intent; are there other beneficiaries; is this an emergency?
Judicial attitudes, rules of construction, and the statutes of the particular
jurisdiction may also play a significant role.
The purpose of this Commentary is threefold: to examine the judi-
cial response to the question of trust termination and modification in var-
ious common factual settings, with particular emphasis on California
decisional law; to describe the major statutory reforms developed in
other jurisdictions; and to suggest possible modifications of current Cali-
fornia law.
4. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 145, at 518 (5th ed. 1973); 4 A.
ScoTr, supra note 3, § 329A, at 2593.
[Vol. 36
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Judicial and Legislative Response to Trust Termination
Courts confronting the trust termination issue generally consider a
number of factors in determining the propriety of the requested termina-
tion or alteration. One major factor involves the status of the individual
seeking the termination: is the proponent the trust settlor, the trustee, or
the beneficiary? Because of the significance of this factor, the following
analysis of the decisional and statutory law regarding trust termination
focuses on three major categories: the right of the settlor to compel ter-
mination, the right of the trustee, and the right of the beneficiary.
The Right of the Settlor to Compel Termination
Revocation and Rescission
Once a trust exists, can the creator of the trust later change his
mind, cancel the arrangement, and have the trust property returned to
his ownership? The answer to this question turns in large part upon
whether the trust is deemed revocable or irrevocable. Generally, the cre-
ation of a trust involves the completed transfer of equitable interests in
the trust property to the beneficiaries. This completed transfer, whether
donative or for consideration, cannot be undone. Therefore in most ju-
risdictions, a trust is deemed irrevocable unless the settlor expressly re-
served a power of revocation.5 "[T]here is no implied reservation to the
settlor of a power to revoke the trust, no matter how unfortunate the act
of creating it may have proved to be.
' 6
Revocable Trusts
A few jurisdictions, including California, have statutorily altered the
rule in favor of irrevocability. Under California Civil Code section 2280,
a trust is deemed revocable unless made expressly irrevocable by its
terms.7 This statute was enacted in 1931 and is applicable to trusts cre-
5. This rule in favor of irrevocability is traceable to early English common-law and is
probably derived from the general law of gifts. 4 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTrrTUTON
§ 18.7, at 31-32 (1978). "If a man will improvidently bind himself up by a voluntary deed,
and not reserve a liberty to himself by a power of revocation, this court will not loose the
fetters he hath put upon himself, but he must lie down under his own folly." Id. (quoting
Villers v. Beaumont, 23 Eng. Rep. 342 (Ch. 1682)).
6. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 998, at 273-74
(rev. 2d ed. 1983).
7. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2280 (West 1954). According to Professor Powell, this type of
legislation represents a codification of the belief of some courts that "no well-advised person
would create a trust without reserving to himself a power of revocation, and hence they were
astute to imply such a power." 4 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 565, at 428.39
(rev. ed. 1981). This judicial attitude was more prevalent "before the days of heavy income
and death taxes." Id.; see also Comment, Trusts and Trustees: Recent Developments in the
March 1985] TRUST TERMINATION
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ated after that date.8 Thus, in California a settlor may terminate a trust
with relative ease. He can simply exercise the statutory power of revoca-
tion by a writing filed with the trustee.9
There is one major pitfall, however. If a trust is expressly made
revocable and the trust instrument specifies how or when the power of
revocation is to be exercised, the California courts generally have held
that the settlor must comply with the terms of the trust in exercising that
power. For example, in Rosenauer v. Title Insurance & Trust Co. 10 the
settlor established a trust containing the following provision:
The Trustor shall have the right at any time during her lifetime
. . . to revoke this Trust in whole or in part by an instrument in writ-
ing executed by the Trustor and delivered to the Trustee. Furthermore,
notwithstanding any other provision contained in this trust instru-
ment, the Trustor retains and shall have the right to appoint the princi-
pal, together with any income accrued or received and undistributed,
of the Trust Estate as shall remain undisposed of upon her death,
which power may be exercised by the Trustor's written instrument
other than a Will filed with the Trustee.Il
When the settlor died, her will was admitted to probate. The will
provided: "This Will revokes the Revocable Trust Agreement. . . be-
tween myself as trustor, and Title Insurance and Trust Company, as the
trustee." 12 The will also stated that "all funds are to come from my
Trust Account at Title Insurance and Trust." 13 Yet neither the will nor
any other written revocation of the trust was delivered to the trustee dur-
ing the lifetime of the settlor.
The executor and beneficiary under the will contended that the pro-
visions of the will constituted an effective revocation under Civil Code
section 2280. The plaintiff argued that the statute contained no require-
Tentative Trust Doctrine: Influence of Civil Code § 2280 on the California Law, 28 CALIF. L.
REv. 202 (1940). Similar statutes exist in Oklahoma and Texas. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60,
§ 175.41 (West 1971); TEX. Civ. STAT. art. 7425b-41 (Vernon 1960). One major advantage of
these statutes is the elimination of litigation involving the question as to whether a power of
revocation was omitted from the trust instrument by mistake. This issue frequently arises in
jurisdictions following the usual rule of presumed irrevocability. See G. BOGERT & G. BO-
GERT, supra note 6, § 998, at 277-82; 4 G. PALMER, supra note 5, § 18.7, at 30-37.
8. Trusts created before 1931 continue to be governed by the former California rule
which, consonant with the majority rule, provided that the settlor can revoke a trust only if he
originally reserved a power of revocation in the trust instrument. See Gray v. Union Trust
Co., 171 Cal. 637, 154 P. 306 (1915).
9. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2280 (West 1954); see Fleishman v. Blechman, 148 Cal. App. 2d
88, 95, 306 P.2d 548, 552 (1957) (any writing clearly manifesting the settlor's intention to
revoke the trust is sufficient).
10. 30 Cal. App. 3d 300, 106 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1973).
11. Id. at 301-02, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 321-22 (emphasis in original).
12. Id. at 302, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
13. Id.
[Vol. 36
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ment that the revocation be fied with the trustee during the life of the
settlor, that the statute did not exclude a will from the definition of a
"writing," and therefore the filing of the will with the trustee after the
death of the decedent complied with the statute. 14
The appellate court rejected these arguments, stating that although
"Civil Code section 2280 was undoubtedly intended to liberalize the
power of revocation in California we do not believe it was intended to
operate as a nullification of a trustor's plainly expressed preference for a
mode of revocation." 15 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied pri-
marily on the Restatement of Trusts 16 and two Massachusetts cases,
17
each of which expresses the view that if the settlor reserved the power to
revoke a trust only in a particular manner, he can revoke the trust only in
the specified manner. Thus, if the settlor reserves the power to revoke
during his lifetime, he cannot exercise the power by will.
18
The court's reliance on the Restatement and Massachusetts case law
is curious because these authorities, in accordance with the American
majority rule, presuppose that a trust is irrevocable unless expressly
made revocable and that there is no implied power of revocation. Under
the majority rule, it is logical to say that if a trust provides for an exclu-
sive or limited method of revocation, the trust instrument is necessarily
controlling. The power of revocation cannot exceed that granted by the
trust instrument. But, as noted earlier, the California statute governing
revocability is one hundred eighty degrees from the majority rule and
presumes that a trust is revocable unless expressly made irrevocable. The
Rosenauer rule deprives a trust settlor of the benefits of Civil Code sec-
14. Id. at 302-03, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
15. Id. at 304, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 330(1) comment j.
17. Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326 Mass. 49, 93 N.E.2d 238 (1950); National
Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944).
18. The majority of courts that have considered this issue have reached the same conclu-
sion. See Annot., 81 A.L.R.3d 959 (1977). In one case, however, the Texas court viewed the
settlor's will as an effective revocation of an inter vivos trust, reasoning that the language of
revocation contained in the trust was not testamentary but was intended to be effective as of
the date of the will's execution. Sanderson v. Aubrey, 472 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
In Sanderson, the trust instrument did not specify a mode of revocation. The applicable Texas
statute provided that "[e]very trust shall be revocable by the trustor during his lifetime, unless
expressly made irrevocable by the terms of the instrument .... " Id. at 286. The question
then was whether the execution of a will containing revocatory language constituted a revoca-
tion during the trustor's lifetime. The court answered this question in the affirmative, viewing
the will as having two aspects: "testamentary in part, but operative in praesenti in other parts."
Id. at 288. For a discussion of this and related cases, see Note, The Revocation of an Inter
Vivos Trust by a Will-in Texas, 24 BAYLOR L. REv. 274 (1972).
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tion 2280 when the trust instrument not only provides for revocability,
but also specifies a manner of revocation.
Despite this gap in logic, the court's decision in Rosenauer is justifi-
able on more pragmatic grounds. If a settlor enters into a trust arrange-
ment with a third party trustee and limits himself to certain methods of
revocation specified in the trust instrument, the trustee should be entitled
to rely on the trust instrument. The Rosenauer decision thus provides
some needed security and certainty to trustees.19
Another justification for the Rosenauer rule is afforded in the case of
Hibernia Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. 20 The trustor
executed a written trust agreement on July 8, 1974, with Wells Fargo
Bank as the trustee. The agreement provided that the trust was revoca-
ble by the settlor, but that the revocation would not be effective unless it
was contained in a notarized writing and approved by the settlor's attor-
ney. Less than one month later, the trustor attempted to revoke the trust
by signing a statement to that effect in the presence of three witnesses.
Shortly thereafter, the settlor was put under a conservatorship. A photo-
copy of the attempted revocation was sent to the trustee by the conserva-
tor. After the settlor's death on August 31, 1974, the trustee refused to
deliver the trust assets to the administrator of the settlor's estate, con-
tending that the trust had not been validly revoked because the pur-
ported revocation was neither notarized nor approved by the settlor's
attorney.
21
The appellate court agreed, relying primarily on Rosenauer.22 The
court also specifically disapproved an earlier California case, Fernald v.
Lawster,23 which suggested that Civil Code section 2280 should override
any trust provisions to the contrary, unless the trust is expressly irrevoca-
ble.24 The court stated that the proposal in Fernald was dictum, unsup-
ported by precedent and likely to have untoward consequences:
While the law might favor the free revocability of a trust in the inter-
ests of the alienability of property generally, there is no basis to con-
clude that such policy would be furthered by denying to a trustor the
power to specify the manner of revocation. Fernald would in effect
require a trustor to create either an irrevocable trust or one freely revo-
19. The court in Rosenauer also rejected the argument that the will provisions constituted
the exercise of the power of appointment retained by the settlor under the trust, reasoning that
the trust prohibited the exercise of the power by will. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 304-05, 106 Cal.
Rptr. at 323-24.
20. 66 Cal. App. 3d 399, 136 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1977).
21. Id. at 402, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
22. Id. at 403-04, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 62-63.
23. 26 Cal. App. 2d 552, 79 P.2d 742 (1938).
24. Hibernia Bank, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 404, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
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cable on written notice. It would not allow him to protect himself
from the consequences of his whim, caprice, momentary indecision, or
of undue influence by other persons.
25
As in Rosenauer, the court's reasoning is somewhat strange. Is a
settlor more likely to be subject to whim, caprice, or undue influence
upon revoking a trust than upon entering into it in the first instance?
The underlying concern of the court in both Rosenauer and Hibernia
Bank may have been ascertaining and safeguarding the settlor's true in-
tent. If the settlor of a trust clearly delineates the method by which the
trust can be revoked and later executes a revocation in compliance with
those terms, we can be reasonably certain that the settlor intended to
revoke the trust arrangement. But if the purported revocation does not
comport with the terms of the trust, we cannot be certain what the settlor
has in mind.26 The problem, of course, is most acute when the settlor has
since died and cannot testify about his true intentions.
In summary, the statutory presumption of trust revocability con-
tained in Civil Code section 2280 has advantages over the current Ameri-
can majority rule. It prevents a trust settlor from becoming unwittingly
trapped in a permanent and irrevocable situation.27 The problems with
the statute seen in Rosenauer and Hibernia Bank could be partially re-
solved by a slight revision of the statute:
Unless expressly made irrevocable by the instrument creating the trust,
every voluntary trust shall be revocable by the trustor (1) by a writing
other than a will filed with the trustee during the lifetime of the trustor
or (2) by the trustor's compliance with any method of revocation speci-
fied in the trust instrument.
This revision would alleviate the difficulties faced by the trustee and
the courts when a trustor purportedly attempts to revoke a trust by will.
This revision, however, would not eliminate the problem of undue influ-
ence on the trustor alluded to by the court in Hibernia Bank. But a
revocation shown to be the product of fraud, duress, or undue influence
can be set aside regardless of the method employed.28 The proposed revi-
25. Id. at 404, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
26. Professor Powell notes that some courts are "extremely strict" in requiring exact
compliance with the terms of a power of revocation, and suggests that "[s]uch formalism is
justifiable only to the extent that it assures clarity in an act which operates to change the rights
of parties." 4 R. POWELL, supra note 7, % 565, at 428.40(1).
27. The impetus behind the 1931 amendment to Civil Code section 2280 was that "many
trustors were not aware that they were creating irrevocable trusts and were unable to revoke
them when their circumstances became such that they needed the trust corpus themselves."
Comment, supra note 7, at 208. The situation was made particularly acute by the Great De-
pression. Id.
28. See 4 G. PALMER, supra note 5, § 20.5, at 202.
March 1985] TRUST TERMINATION
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sion would also eliminate the current dichotomy between the existing
statutory and case law.
Irrevocable Trusts
If a trust is deemed irrevocable, premature termination of the trust
by the settlor is more problematic. 29 Under what circumstances can the
settlor compel termination? One possible solution is to obtain the con-
sent of all beneficiaries to an early termination of the trust.30 Another
avenue open to the settlor is to attempt to have the trust voided on the
grounds of fraud, undue influence, or lack of capacity. These are well
established grounds for the rescission of a trust, or indeed, any gratuitous
transfer of property, and the law governing the rescission of inter vivos
transfers generally is applicable to declarations of trust and transfers in
trust.3
1
For example, when the settlor's signature to a deed of trust was ob-
tained by misrepresentation, rescission of the transaction was granted by
the court.32 Similarly, the California Supreme Court upheld the cancel-
lation of a trust when the declaration of trust was executed while the
settlor was "in an extremely agitated and nervous condition" and
through the exercise of undue influence.
33
A related ground for seeking termination of a trust involves mistake.
A settlor is entitled to rescind a trust that was created as a result of a
material mistake.34 It is not necessary that the mistake be mutual; it may
be the unilateral mistake of the settlor, assuming that there was no con-
29. In California the settlor must expressly make the trust irrevocable. See supra text
accompanying note 7. In states following the majority rule, irrevocability is presumed absent
an express reservation of power to revoke. See supra text accompanying note 5.
30. This solution and its attendant problems are explored infra notes 161-211 & accom-
panying text.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 333; Report of Committee on
Modification, Revocation and Termination of Trusts, Early Termination of Trusts, 2 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. 303 (1967). In the event that a trust is established for consideration,
failure of consideration may also constitute grounds for rescission. Hower v. Woman's Home
Missionary Soc'y, 4 Cal. App. 2d 719, 723, 41 P.2d 583, 585 (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 333 comment g. But see Comment, Trusts: Recission of Convey-
ancefor Failure of Consideration, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 309 (1918) (suggesting that if the failure of
consideration involves a breach of trust, the remedy should be enforcement of the trust, not
rescission).
32. Schaper v. Schaper, 84 Ill. 603 (1877).
33. See, e.g., Weakley v. Melton, 189 Cal. 44, 49-51, 207 P. 523, 526 (1922); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 333 comment c. But see Hutchins v.
Security Trust, 208 Cal. 463, 475, 281 P. 1026, 1031 (1929) (accepting the "fruits" of the trust
ratifies its terms; no rescission based on claim of undue influence and coercion).
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 333 comment e.
[Vol. 36
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sideration for the trust.35 The most commonly claimed "mistakes" in-
clude the assertion that a power of revocation was mistakenly omitted
from the trust, or that the settlor mistakenly believed that he had such a
power.
36
According to the Restatement of Trusts, such a mistake is grounds
for the reformation or revocation of the trust.37 The mistake, however,
cannot be proved merely by the subsequent statement or testimony of the
settlor about his beliefs or state of mind at the time of the creation of the
trust; corroborating evidence is necessary. 38 Thus, the essential problem
is one of proof. But as Professor Palmer has noted, the courts frequently
consider a variety of circumstances in such cases, including the improvi-
dence of the trust and the hardship on the settlor. These factors, when
coupled with the statements of the settlor, may well provide a basis for
equitable relief.39 Professor Palmer has suggested that the willingness of
the courts to grant rescission on the ground of "mistake" can mitigate
the harsh majority rule that a trust is deemed irrevocable unless expressly
made revocable. He also criticized the evidentiary requirements imposed
by the Restatement, pointing out that "[t]he finality attached to inter
vivos trusts rests on uncertain ground at best, and it is unwise to rein-
force a rule of doubtful validity by the stringent evidentiary requirements
of the Restatement."4
Because California has departed from the majority rule regarding
the irrevocability of inter vivos trusts, the issues and problems raised in
other jurisdictions concerning the settlor's mistaken beliefs as to revoca-
bility are not generally the subject of litigation here. This factor is a
significant advantage of the present California rule and militates against
the wholesale adoption of the majority rule in California.
Modification
Suppose that after creating a trust, the settlor wishes to modify one
or more of its terms. May he do so? The law pertaining to the modifica-
tion of a trust by the settlor is closely analogous to the rules regarding
35. Wright, Termination of Trusts in Pennsylvania-Some Current Trends, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 917, 929-30 (1967).
36. Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1229, 1231 (1958); see 4 G. PALMER, supra note 5, § 18.7, at 31.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 332(1).
38. Id. comment c.
39. G. PALMER, supra note 5, § 18.7, at 33.
40. Id. at 36. Professor Palmer ultimately concludes that the doctrine of mistake does
not provide a truly satisfactory solution to the sad problems raised in many of the so-called
mistake cases and suggests that "it would be well to accept improvidence as a basis for rescis-
sion." Id. at 37.
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termination. If the settlor has retained a power to modify either adminis-
trative or distributive provisions, or both, he can make whatever modifi-
cations are within the scope of that power.41 Under the majority
American view, however, if the settlor has failed to reserve a power of
modification, he has no right to change either administrative or disposi-
tive provisions. 42 The underlying rationale for the majority rule is that in
creating the trust, the settlor has made a transfer of particular property
interests, and he cannot later change the size or incidents of those prop-
erty interests unless he has retained the power to do so in the trust instru-
ment.43 The majority rule respecting modification thus presupposes the
irrevocability of the trust.
In California, by contrast, a trust is deemed revocable unless made
irrevocable and therefore, in the absence of express irrevocability, should
be readily modifiable by the settlor. The power to revoke is generally
deemed to include the power to modify or amend. 44 The rationale is that
if the trustor can terminate the trust by exercising the power of revoca-
tion and then create a new trust on the desired terms, he should be able
to accomplish the desired result in one step by the amendment or modifi-
cation of the original trust.
45
If the trust is irrevocable, and the settlor has not retained a power to
modify or amend, modification may still be possible, either by proof of
mistake46 or by obtaining the consent of all beneficiaries. 47 When there
has been a mistake in expressing the terms of an inter vivos trust, the
settlor may obtain reformation of the trust instrument.48 The mistake
may be the unintentional omission of a power of modification, 4 9 an error
41. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 993, at 230-42; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 331(1). Note that a broad power of modification may be tanta-
mount to a power of revocation because the settlor could simply modify the trust to the point
of revocation. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 993, at 237; see also Heifetz v. Bank
of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 776, 305 P.2d 979 (1957) (holding that an
irrevocable trust may be terminated by the process of eliminating beneficiaries under a power
to amend until there are only beneficiaries who are sui juris and consent to the termination).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 331(2).
43. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 992, at 218-22.
44. See, e.g., Heifetz v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 776, 777,
305 P.2d 979, 980 (1957).
45. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 1001, at 331-32; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 331 comment g; Note, Trusts: Power to Revoke in Part as Includ-
ing Power to Terminate, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 556, 557 (1957).
46. 4 G. PALMER, supra note 5, § 18.7, at 43.
47. For a discussion of the problems involved in obtaining the consent of all beneficiaries,
see infra notes 161-211 & accompanying text.
48. 4 G. PALMER, supra note 5, § 18.7, at 43.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 332(2).
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HeinOnline -- 36 Hastings L. J. 572 1984-1985
TRUST TERMINATION
in the description of trust property or beneficiaries, 50 or even a mistake as
to the legal effect of the trust, particularly tax consequences.51
Another way for the settlor of an irrevocable and nonmodifiable
trust to achieve a modification of the trust terms is by obtaining the con-
sent of all beneficiaries. If all the beneficiaries are sui juris and consent to
the proposed alteration, they should be estopped from later asserting that
the amendment or modification was not effective.52 The problem with
this approach is that the beneficiaries may be recalcitrant, or may not be
competent, or indeed may not all be living. These problems are explored
below.5 3
Termination or Modification by the Trustee
Generally, a trustee has no power to modify or terminate a trust
unless the trust instrument or statute expressly confers such a power.
54
But certain discretionary powers that are frequently conferred upon
trustees, particularly the power to invade the corpus, may be tantamount
to a power of termination.55
For example, if the trustee has discretion to pay to, or to apply the
trust principal for the benefit of, a particular beneficiary, the exercise of
this discretionary power ultimately could result in the termination of the
trust through exhaustion of the res. The underlying issue in such a situa-
50. See Sawtelle Trust, 12 Pa. Fiduc. 665 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962). See gener-
ally Wright, supra note 35, at 930-31.
51. 4 G. PALMER, supra note 5, § 18.7, at 37.
The latter type of mistake is illustrated in Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449 (9th
Cir. 1964). In Flitcroft, the settlor attempted to establish "Clifford trusts" for the benefit of his
children. The trusts, if irrevocable, would free the settlor from tax liability on the income
generated by the trust property during the ten-year term of the trusts. The settlor, however,
apparently was unaware that under California Civil Code § 2280 a voluntary trust is revocable
unless expressly made irrevocable; the settlor failed to provide expressly for irrevocability.
When the error was discovered, the settlor sought and obtained a state coirt decree reforming
the trusts to provide that they were irrevocable from the date of creation. Fortunately for the
settlor, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals treated the reformed trusts as irrevocable from the
date of creation and therefore the settlor achieved the desired tax benefits. Id. at 459-60. The
Ninth Circuit noted that the mistake involved was not really one of tax law, but rather one of
California trust law. Id. at 456.
Whether a court would grant reformation when the only mistake concerned the terms of
the trust in order to obtain the tax advantage is an open question. 4 G. PALMER, supra note 5,
§ 18.7, at 43. Professor Palmer points out that a state court would likely allow reformation,
but the effect of the reformation decree on the tax claim would be a federal question. Id.
52. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 992, at 223.
53. See infra notes 161-211 & accompanying text.
54. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 992, at 228.
55. See Boyden v. Stevens, 285 Mass. 176, 188 N.E. 741 (1934); 4 A. Scor, supra note
3, § 334.1, at 2647-48.
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tion concerns the limitations placed upon the trustee's discretion. These
limitations may be imposed by the trust instrument; the instrument may
provide that the discretionary power is exercisable only under a certain
set of defined circumstances. Usually, though, such discretionary powers
are conferred to ensure the flexibility to adapt the trust to changing cir-
cumstances, and therefore such grants of discretionary power are fre-
quently quite broad.
What then are the controls upon the trustee exercising such a broad
discretionary power to achieve termination of a trust? The answer, sim-
ply, is that he must not abuse his discretion.5 6 This standard is generally
held to mean that the trustee must act in good faith, from proper mo-
tives, and within the bounds of reasonable judgment:
5 7
[A]lthough there is a field, often a wide field, within which the trustee
may determine whether to act or not and when and how to act, yet
beyond that field the court will control him. How wide that field is
depends upon the terms of the trust, the nature of the power, and all
the circumstances.
5 8
How wide is the field when the trustee is simply given the power to
invade the corpus for the benefit of the income beneficiary? This ques-
tion was raised in the leading case of Kemp v. Paterson59 and answered
narrowly by the New York court.
In Kemp, the settlor established a trust which provided that after the
56. The Restatement provides that where "discretion is conferred upon the trustee with
respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court, except to
prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS,
supra note 2, § 187.
57. 3 A. SCOTr, supra note 3, § 187, at 1501. When the trustee is given "absolute" or
"unlimited" discretion by the express terms of the trust instrument, Professor Scott and the
Restatement would dispense with the requirement of reasonableness:
In such a case the mere fact that the trustee has acted beyond the bounds of a reason-
able judgment is not a sufficient ground for interposition by the court, so long as the
trustee acts in a state of mind in which it was contemplated by the settlor that he
would act.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 187 comment j; see also 3 A. ScoTr,
supra note 3, § 187.2, at 1513-18. In contrast, Professor Halbach argues that it is likely that
courts will continue to apply a standard of reasonableness to the exercise of a discretionary
power, even when such power is absolute. Halbach, Problems of Discretion in Discretionary
Trusts, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1431 (1961). Professors Dukeminier and Johanson take a
middle ground on this question, finding that "[i]n the final analysis it appears that the differ-
ence between simple discretion and 'absolute' discretion is one of degree and that the trustee's
action must not only be in good faith but to some extent reasonable, with more elasticity in the
concept of reasonableness the greater the discretion given." J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON,
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 538 (3d ed. 1984). The latter approach appears to be the most
sensible and pragmatic.
58. 3 A. SCOTr, supra note 3, § 187, at 1501.
59. 6 N.Y.2d 40, 159 N.E.2d 661, 188 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1959).
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settlor's death, the trustees were to pay the settlor's daughter "all of the
net income annually during the rest of her life and so much of the princi-
pal sums of the trust from time to time as the Trustees may deem for
[her] best interest." Upon the death of the daughter, the trustees were to
transfer the corpus to the daughter's issue then living, and if there were
none, then to certain other individuals.6° The daughter did not need the
principal for her support, but she was a British subject and the trust in-
come was subject to a 92 1/2% tax; moreover, at her death the trust
principal would be subject to heavy British estate taxes.
61
To minimize the impact of these taxes, the trustees, with the consent
of the income beneficiary, sought to terminate the trust by the exercise of
their discretionary power to pay the principal to the daughter. The court
concluded that the trustees were acting honestly and in good faith.62
Nevertheless, the majority held that the trust provision authorizing the
trustee to invade principal for the best interest of the income beneficiary
did not empower the trustees to turn over the entire corpus to the daugh-
ter under the existing circumstances. In the court's view, "the power to
use the principal of the trust may not be enlarged into a power to termi-
nate it. ' '63
The reasoning of the majority opinion appears specious. The trust-
ees unquestionably had the power to terminate the trust by the invasion
of the corpus. If the income beneficiary had been in serious financial
straits, with mounting medical bills, it is unlikely that the court would
have objected to the total invasion of the corpus and the ensuing termina-
tion of the trust. The fundamental question involves the limitation upon
the exercise of the power. Because the decision of the trustees to termi-
nate the trust was made in good faith, from the proper motives, and met
the standard of "reasonableness," the restrictions on the exercise of the
power must be gleaned from the .terms of the trust itself. The only limi-
tation that the settlor in Kemp placed upon the power was that it be used
for the "best interest" of the income beneficiary.
The question then becomes one of interpretation: What did the set-
tlor mean by the phrase "best interest"? The term "best interest" implies
a very flexible standard, embracing whatever objectives the trustees deem
appropriate. 4 Indeed, the lower court opinion, approved and relied
60. Id. at 43, 159 N.E.2d at 662, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 162 (quoting trust instrument).
61. Id. at 45, 159 N.E.2d at 663, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 164 (Dye, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 44, 159 N.E.2d at 662, 188 N.Y.S. 2d at 163.
64. Note, Trusts--Power to Distribute from Corpus Does Not Entail Power to Terminate
Trust, 34 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 173, 175 (1959); see also Fleming, "Best Interests" as a Standard
for Trustee Action, 46 ILL. B.J. 765 (1958) ("best interests" as a broad standard).
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upon by the majority in Kemp, admitted that the proposed transfer
would "in a sense . . . serve the beneficiary's 'best interest,' " but the
court apparently was more concerned about the interests of the
remaindermen.
65
The court's concern for the remaindermen seems inapposite be-
cause, if the trust instrument authorizes the invasion of corpus for the
benefit of the income beneficiary, the remaindermen have the right only
to whatever principal remains at the death of the life beneficiary. 66 "The
rights of remaindermen are subordinate to the primary purpose of the
trust .... *"67 Moreover, as the dissent pointed out, if the trust was not
terminated the income beneficiary would be deprived of nearly all in-
come, and the remaindermen ultimately would receive less than one-
third of the trust corpus. 68 If, however, the trust were terminated, the
income would be taxed at a much lower rate and the corpus would be-
come available to the remaindermen without deduction for tax.69 "Obvi-
ously such a plan would not be detrimental to the beneficiary." '70 The
effect of the majority opinion is to deprive the trustees of their discretion,
thereby removing the flexibility that the settlor had built into the trust
instrument. The result runs counter to the expressed intent of the settlor.
The decision in Kemp v. Patterson should be viewed as a warning to
draftsmen that the use of general phrases such as "best interest" may be
interpreted rigidly or narrowly by the courts to the detriment of the set-
tlor's ultimate objectives and that the powers of the trustee should be
expressed in clear and unequivocal language.
71
In addition to discretionary powers of invasion, trustees frequently
are given the power to terminate the trust when the corpus falls below a
certain dollar amount. Even if the trust instrument does not contain such
a provision, California statutes authorize the trustee to petition the court
for termination when the fair market value of the principal is so low that
the costs and burdens of administration outweigh any benefits to be
gained from continuance of the trust.72 In such an event, the trust prop-
65. Kemp, 6 N.Y.2d at 46, 159 N.E.2d at 663, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 164-65 (Dye, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting trial court).
66. Note, supra note 64, at 175.
67. Id.
68. Kemp, 6 N.Y.2d at 45, 159 N.E.2d at 663, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 164 (Dye, J., dissenting).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Note, Trusts-Power to Terminate-"Best Interest" of Beneficiary, 26 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 156, 157-60 (1959).
72. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2279.1 (West Supp. 1984); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1120.6, 1138.1
(West 1981). These statutes are applicable even if the trust is spendthrift or contains other
protective provisions. Id. See generally 60 CAL. JUR. 3D Trusts § 245 (1980).
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erty will be distributed to the beneficiaries in a manner conforming as
closely as possible to the settlor's intent.
73
Right of the Beneficiaries to Compel Termination
Suppose that for one reason or another, a trust beneficiary desires to
remove himself from the constraints of the trust and to achieve outright
ownership of the trust property. Under what circumstances can the trust
beneficiary compel termination of the trust to attain this result? Gener-
ally, if all the beneficiaries are sui juris and agree to the termination,
courts permit the termination of the trust unless a material purpose of
the settlor would thereby be defeated. 74 Thus, a trust beneficiary must
overcome two major hurdles to achieve termination: (1) the material




Under the current American majority rule, a beneficiary who seeks
an early termination of a trust must show that either the settlor's purpose
has been accomplished or it is impossible of accomplishment.76 This rule
was developed in this country in the late nineteenth century77 and runs
sharply counter to the attitude taken by English courts to trust termina-
tion. The English view emphasizes the equitable ownership rights of the
beneficiary; if all the beneficiaries are sui juris, they may compel the ter-
mination regardless of the intention or purposes of the settlor.78 Thus,
although the intention of the settlor governs the extent of the beneficial
73. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2279.1 (West Supp. 1984); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1120.6 (West
1981). See generally Procedures for Terminating Small Trusts, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
988 (1984).
74. 4 A. SCOT, supra note 3, § 337, at 2655; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS,
supra note 2, § 337; see, e.g., Moor v. Vawter, 84 Cal. App. 678, 683-84, 258 P. 622, 624
(1927).
75. If the settlor is still alive and consents to the termination, the material purpose doc-
trine will not be a barrier to termination, but the problem of obtaining the consent of all
beneficiaries may remain. See 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 3, § 338, at 2687-88.
76. 4 R. POWELL, supra note 7, 1 567, at 428.50. It has been suggested that there is
really no American "minority" view on this point, and that the few American cases that have
allowed termination seemingly in contravention of the rule "appear to have overlooked rather
than.. . rejected it." Comment, Trusts-Termination by Consent of Beneficiaries--Who are
Beneficiaries--Acceleration of Equitable Remainders, 37 MIcH. L. REv. 941, 942 n.5 (1939).
77. 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 3, § 337.1, at 2662-63.
78. 4 R. POWELL, supra note 7, 1 567, at 428.49. The English rule was followed in some
early American decisions, and has been adopted in Pennsylvania and Virginia. Id.; see 4 A.
Scorr, § 337.1, supra note 3, at 2662-63.
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interests, it does not limit the control of such interests. 79 Underlying the
English rule is a policy favoring free alienability and control of property
by the living. s0
The American rule, by contrast, places great weight on the intention
and goals of the settlor and hence will not permit termination of a trust,
even when all the beneficiaries are sui juris and consent, if the termina-
tion would defeat a material purpose of the settlor.8s One major problem
in the application of the American rule involves discerning the material
purposes of the settlor and then determining whether premature termina-
tion would thwart those purposes. Because these questions are essen-
tially factual, the cases are not wholly consistent. Nevertheless, some
patterns are discernable. The presence or absence of certain factors plays
a major role in predicting whether termination will be permitted under
the American standard.
For the purpose of analysis, the cases may be conveniently grouped
into the following four categories: trusts involving the postponement of
enjoyment to a certain age; trusts involving successive beneficiaries;
spendthrift trusts; and exigent circumstances justifying the modification
79. 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 337, at 2655. The divergent attitudes of the English and
American courts are also seen in the area of spendthrift trusts. English courts have refused to
recognize the doctrine, reasoning that a settlor cannot make the beneficial interests inalienable
by the equitable owners, while the great majority of American courts have allowed restraints
on the alienation of equitable interests. Id. at 2656; see G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note
6, § 1008, at 412-13, 420-37; Evans, The Termination of Trusts, 37 YALE L.J. 1070 (1928);
Note, Trusts: Termination: Power of Equity Court to Terminate Trust on Application of Benefi-
ciary, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 453 (1946).
80. 4 R. POWELL, supra note 7, 1 567, at 428.49. The leading English case is Saunders v.
Vautier, 49 Eng. Rep. 282, (1841). In Saunders, the trust terms provided that the beneficiary
was to receive the trust corpus at age 25. The court, however, granted his application for full
payment at age 21. The court in Saunders gave little reasoning in support of its position: "the
point seems. . . to have been rather assumed than decided." Wharton v. Masterman, 1895
A.C. 186, 193. But subsequent cases following the Saunders rule reasoned that once the prop-
erty interests are vested in the beneficiary, he is the sole owner, and such restrictions are incon-
sistent with or repugnant to the property rights granted. Gosling v. Gosling, 70 Eng. Rep.
423, 426 (V.C. 1859); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 1008, at 412-13. It has been
suggested that the "reasons" given by the English courts in support of the Saunders rule are
not so much reasons as mere reiterations of the rule and that the real problem is not one of
legal logic or reasoning, but one of public policy: "to what extent a testator or donor inter
vivos should be allowed to control not only the disposition, but also the enjoyment of his
property." 26 NOTRE DAME LAW. 158, 161 (1950).
81. The guiding principle at the base of both the English rule and the American rule is
the same: to allow a property owner to make free use of his property so long as no public
policy is violated. The major distinction, then, is who the courts perceive as the "owner": the
creator of the trust or the beneficiary. There is no purely logical answer to this conundrum.
See Note, Post-Mortem Control of Property Through the Trust Device, 18 U. CIN. L. REV. 197,
199 (1949).
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of a trust. Ndedless to say, these analytical categories are artificial con-
structs, and many cases fall into more than one category.
Postponement of Enjoyment
If a trust has been established for the benefit of a single beneficiary
with the provision that the principal is to be distributed to the beneficiary
upon his attainment of a certain age, it is extremely unlikely that the
beneficiary will be able to achieve termination of the trust prior to reach-
ing the specified age. This conclusion is mandated by the doctrine de-
rived from the leading case of Claflin v. Claflin,82 decided by the
Massachusetts court in 1889.
In Claflin, the settlor established a testamentary trust for one of his
sons. The terms of the trust provided that $10,000 of the corpus would be
paid to the son at age twenty-one, another $10,000 at age twenty-five, and
the remaining principal balance at age thirty.8 3 After reaching age
twenty-one, the son sought to compel the trustees to pay him the entire
balance of the trust fund, relying on the English rule84 that trust provi-
sions postponing the payment of money beyond the age of majority are
void.85 The court rejected the beneficiary's argument, reasoning that the
trust was not dry, its purposes had not been accomplished, and the inten-
tion of the settlor should be carried out.
86
The court recognized that the beneficiary's interest was not subject
to any spendthrift provision, but stated that merely because the settlor
had not imposed all possible restrictions, it did not follow that "the re-
strictions which he had imposed should not be carried into effect."' 87 The
court concluded that the restrictions placed upon the plaintiff's posses-
sion and control of the property were not altogether useless because they
ensured that the beneficiary could not spend the property all at once.
88
82. 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889).
83. Id. at 20, 20 N.E. at 455.
84. See supra notes 78-80 & accompanying text.
85. Claflin, 149 Mass. at 21, 20 N.E. at 455.
86. Id. at 23, 20 N.E. at 456.
In the case at bar nothing has happened which the testator did not anticipate, and for
which he has not made provision. It is plainly his will that neither the income nor
any part of the principal should now be paid to the plaintiff. . . .[W]e are unable to
see that the directions of the testator... are against public policy, or are so far




88. It cannot be said that these restrictions [placed] upon the plaintiff's possession
and control of the property are not altogether useless, for there is not the same dan-
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The Claflin decision has been widely followed in the United States
and represents the American majority rule.89 Courts upholding the Claf-
lin doctrine place great emphasis on the intention of the settlor and on
their duty to recognize and carry out that intent, even though such ac-
tion may thwart the desires and needs of the beneficiaries. This judicial
attitude is illustrated by the California Supreme Court's decision in
Moxley v. Title Insurance & Trust Co.,90 which rigorously applied the
Claflin doctrine. In Moxley, the beneficiary was to receive the trust
corpus and any accumulated income at age thirty-five. The trust had
been established by the beneficiary's mother when the beneficiary was
fifteen years old. At the time of the termination action, the beneficiary
was twenty-six years old, happily married, and living with her husband.
She sought termination in order to use the trust principal for the
purchase of a house. 91 The beneficiary sought to avoid the operation of
the Claflin doctrine on the grounds of changed circumstances and ac-
complishment of trust purposes.92 She also pointed out that the trust
was not spendthrift. 93 The court rejected the beneficiary's arguments:
"In substance, plaintiff's pleading of 'changed conditions' amounts to no
more than the pleading of mere considerations of convenience to herself
as a ground for frustration of the testamentary design for administration
of the trust, and she cannot prevail."
'94
In the court's view, the absence of spendthrift features should not
ger that he will spend the property while it is in the hands of the trustees as there
would be if it were in his own.
Id.
89. 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 337.3, at 2668-70.
90. 27 Cal. 2d 457, 165 P.2d 15 (1946); see Note, supra note 79, at 453; 15 FORDHAM L.
REV. 303 (1946).
91. Moxley, 27 Cal. 2d at 461, 165 P.2d at 17.
92. When the settlor executed her will, she was separated from her husband and wanted
to provide for the security of her teenage daughter who lived with her. There was then the
possibility that this trust would be the daughter's sole financial security because the father
might remarry and leave his property to other individuals. The father died some years after
the mother, however, and left his property to his daughter under a trust, making it unnecessary
for her to depend solely on the mother's trust for future security. Id. at 476, 165 P.2d at 25
(Traynor, J., dissenting). The beneficiary alleged that the primary purpose of the trust was to
protect her during her minority by providing for her support and education and that this trust
purpose had been accomplished. She further argued that because of her father's death, she was
"unable to have comforts and necessities and to buy a home as she could if her father were
alive. . . and said situation was not contemplated by [the settlor] and therefore no provision
was made for the same." Id. at 461, 165 P.2d at 17.
93. Id. at 461, 165 P.2d at 17.
94. Id. at 465, 165 P.2d at 19. The court conceded that changed circumstances may,
under certain conditions, warrant a modification of a trust in order to accomplish the "real
intent" of the settlor, but concluded that such circumstances did not exist here. Id. at 466-67,
165 P.2d at 20. The court also recognized that a "dry" or "passive" trust may be terminated
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change this result; the settlor "may have had good reason for desiring
that the corpus of the trust should not go to plaintiff until she should
attain the specified age." 95 Furthermore, the court should "discourage
wastage, by refusing the decree of termination, in the hope that the cestui
will not think of alienation, or will find it too costly to use, or will be
unable to find a buyer for his interest."
96
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Traynor did not directly attack the
Claflin doctrine, but rather emphasized that the Claflin doctrine does not
preclude termination of a trust on equitable grounds:
In this state ... a court of equity has inherent power to terminate a
trust before the end of the period specified in the trust instrument. The
beneficiaries of a trust other than a spendthrift trust may secure its
termination if all the beneficiaries are suijuris and all agree upon its
termination, and if a court of equity concludes that the best interests of
the beneficiaries will be served thereby.
97
The dissent concluded that the beneficiary had presented equitable
grounds for termination of the trust sufficient at least to allow her to go
to trial.98
Claflin and its progeny have been sharply criticized over the years.
Professor Gray was as hostile to the Claflin doctrine as he was to the
spendthrift trust doctrine, viewing both as reflective of a pernicious
paternalism:
The law has fixed the age of responsibility at twenty-one; if that is too
young, let the law be changed, but the wisdom of allowing individuals
to change it at their pleasure in not clear. And, if paternalism is to be
introduced into our law, its introduction in this particular class of
cases seems to be without the advantages that may exist elsewhere, and
to retain only its irritating and demoralizing features.99
The doctrine also runs counter to the policy favoring free alienabil-
ity.10° Although in the absence of a spendthrift clause the beneficiary is
prior to the time fixed by the trust instrument, but indicated that the instant trust was active
and hence beyond the ambit of that rule. Id. at 465-67, 165 P.2d at 19-20.
95. Id. at 463, 165 P.2d at 18.
96. Id. at 464, 165 P.2d at 18 (quoting 4 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUST-
Ers 2938-39 (1935)).
97. Moxley, 27 Cal. 2d at 469, 165 P.2d at 22 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 476, 165 P.2d at 25 (Traynor, J. dissenting). Further ramifications of the dis-
senting opinion in Moxley are explored in the section of the Commentary dealing with distrib-
utive deviation. See infra notes 136-59 & accompanying text.
99. J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY § 124o (2d ed. 1895).
Professor Scott reiterated this argument against the Claflin doctrine as follows: "The purpose
of a spendthrift trust is the coddling of a person as against himself and as against third persons.
The purpose of postponement of enjoyment is simply the coddling of a person against himself."
Scott, Control of Property by the Dead, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 632, 648 (1917).
100. 4 R. POWELL, supra note 7, 1 567, at 428.51; Scott, supra note 99, at 649-50.
March 1985]
HeinOnline -- 36 Hastings L. J. 581 1984-1985
free to transfer his interest, any restrictions postponing enjoyment apply
with equal force to the transferee. Thus, the transferee is in no better
position to compel termination than the original beneficiary. 10 1 This fac-
tor, although essential to the enforceability of the Claflin rule, necessarily
diminishes the marketability of the beneficial interest.1
02
A related criticism leveled against the doctrine is that it is impracti-
cal. If, as in Claflin and Moxley, there are no spendthrift restrictions, the
beneficiary is free to alienate his or her interest to a stranger. It is obvi-
ous that the settlor could have had no intent or purpose in preserving the
trust property for a stranger; furthermore, the goal of protecting the ben-
eficiary clearly is thwarted by the sale of the beneficial interest at a se-
verely discounted price. Thus, the Claflin doctrine ultimately causes the
waste of beneficial interests.
0 3
Finally, as the dissent in Moxley observed, an extra-judicial termina-
tion of a trust may be achieved by an agreement between the trustee and
the beneficiary, with a transfer of the trust assets to the beneficiary. To
preclude the same result by court decree, as the Claflin doctrine does,
penalizes beneficiaries when they conscientiously seek a judicially sanc-
tioned termination or when the trustee is desirous of continuing commis-
sions and refuses to agree to termination.1o4
Many of the objections to the Claflin doctrine would be eliminated if
the scope of the doctrine were limited to trusts containing spendthrift
provisions. The presence of spendthrift features is a much stronger indi-
cation of a protective purpose on the part of the settlor than mere post-
ponement of enjoyment. 10 5 Thus, California should abolish the Claflin
101. 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 337.3, at 2671-72.
102. See J. GRAY, supra note 99, § 124m, n. 103. Property sold in presenti, but not to be
delivered for many years, must be sold at a sacrifice, and when the seller is a person of the
character for whom such restraints are supposed to be useful, the chances are that it will be
sold at a very great sacrifice. In fact, the law, by sanctioning such restraints, is exposing inex-
perienced youth to those "catching bargains," against which the old-fashioned equity always
strove to protect it. Id. § 124n; see G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 1008, at 419; 4
R. POWELL, supra note 7, 567, at 428.51; Note, Termination of Trusts, 46 YALE L.J. 1005,
1011 (1937); 15 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 307 (1946).
103. Moxley, 27 Cal. 2d at 472, 165 P.2d at 23 (Traynor, J., dissenting); G. BOGERT & G.
BOGERT, supra note 6, § 1008, at 419.
104. 4 R. POWELL, supra note 7, 567, at 428.53. For a discussion of the impact of
spendthrift restrictions on the Claflin doctrine, see infra notes 122-37 & accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 120-35 & accompanying text. It should be noted that there is one
major limitation on the operation of the Claflin doctrine. A trust cannot remain indestructible
beyond the perpetuities period. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 57, at 581; Com-
ment, Trusts-Duration and Indestructibility, 24 TENN. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1957). Califor-
nia Civil Code § 771 codifies this rule, providing that "[w]henever a trust has existed longer
than the time within which future interests in property must vest under this title. . . [i]t shall
be terminated upon the request of a majority of the beneficiaries." CAL. CIV. CODE § 771
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rule except as it relates to spendthrift trusts.10 6
Successive Beneficiaries
When a settlor has created a trust providing that the income is to be
paid to one beneficiary for life, and on the death of the income beneficiary
the principal is to be paid to another, the mere fact that successive inter-
ests have been created generally is not held to be evidence of any "mate-
rial purpose" on the part of the settlor precluding termination prior to
the death of the income beneficiary. 10 7 Thus, if the income beneficiary
and the remainderman are both competent and consent to the termina-
tion, they may compel termination.10 8 Similarly, if the income benefici-
ary acquires the remainder interest, or if the remainderman acquires the
income interest, termination can be compelled.10 9
If, however, in addition to successive interests, there is other evi-
dence of a "material purpose" of the settlor that remains unfulfilled, ter-
mination will not be permitted.110 Such other evidence may be in the
(West 1982). Thus, if a trust has endured longer than the perpetuities period, it may be termi-
nated regardless of whether there is a material purpose of the settlor that remains unfulfilled.
For a critical analysis of the California statute, see Dukeminier, Perpetuities Revision in Cali-
fornia: Perpetual Trusts Permitted, 55 CALIF. L. Rnv. 678, 685-90 (1967).
106. See RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUsTS, supra note 2, § 337 comment f; 4 A.
Scorr, supra note 3, § 337.1, at 2664. But see Comment, supra note 76, at 943-45 suggesting
that this rule is not inevitable:
Though it is reasonable to infer that the settlor's purpose is only to provide for the
several beneficiaries, it is just as reasonable to infer that his purpose is to deprive the
life cestui of enjoyment of the corpus, that otherwise he would have divided the
corpus and have given the parcels outright to the beneficiaries.
Id. at 945.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs, supra note 2, § 337 comment f; 4 A. Scowt,
supra note 3, § 337.1, at 2658.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 337 comment f; 4 A. SCOTT,
supra note 3, § 337.1, at 2658-60.
109. Id.; see, eg., Ealde v. Ingram, 142 Cal. 15, 75 P. 566 (1903).
110. 4 A. Scorr, supra note 3, § 337.1, at 2660-62. This rule generally holds even when
termination would facilitate the settlement of a will contest. Winn, Will Compromises Affect-
ing Trusts, 92 TR. & Esr. 777 (1953). See generally 4 A. ScoT, supra note 3, § 337.6, at 2676-
82 (compromise agreements). For example, in the leading case of Adams v. Link, 145 Conn.
634, 145 A.2d 753 (1958), the testator's will established a testamentary trust which provided
that the income was to be paid to two individuals for life, and on the death of the survivor, the
principal was to be distributed to a charitable institution. The trust contained no spendthrift
restrictions. The will was contested by the testator's heirs at law. A compromise was eventu-
ally struck, whereby a portion of the corpus would be paid outright to the contestants, another
portion to the surviving income beneficiary, and a third portion to the charitable remainder-
man. The court refused to approve the compromise agreement, reasoning that the testator had
two objectives that would be defeated by termination of the trust: (1) financial management of
the trust corpus by trustees selected by the testator, and (2) preclusion of expenditure of the
principal by the life beneficiaries. Id. at 639, 145 A.2d at 755-56. According to the court, the
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form of spendthrift restrictions, 11 support provisions, 12 or even extrin-
sic evidence.' 13 For example, in Estate of Easterday,114 the income bene-
ficiary of the trust acquired the remainder interest in one-fourth of the
corpus and sought to compel termination of the trust as to that one-
quarter interest. There were no spendthrift restrictions. 1 5 Nevertheless,
the court refused to allow termination. The testimony of the settlor's
attorney indicated that the settlor had a protective intent to provide sup-
port to his son, the income beneficiary, during his life. The son was un-
able to support himself. The court held that such extrinsic evidence was
admissible to establish the trust purposes" 6 and found that the evidence
demonstrated the settlor's purpose that "his son should, for his own
good, not have control of the principal, and that, in the circumstances,
his purpose was a wise one."' 117 Although the trust lacked spendthrift
features, the court indicated that the mere possibility the beneficiary
might circumvent the settlor's purposes by selling his interest was an in-
sufficient reason for destroying the legal interest of the settlor in creating
the trust. The court added hopefully: "The life beneficiary may be un-
able to find a buyer. .... ,,11
lack of spendthrift restrictions did not indicate that the settlor intended no protection at all.
Id. at 640, 145 A.2d at 756. The principles espoused in Adams v. Link have a wide following.
See Annot., 29 A.L.R.3D 8, 45-52 (1970). With respect to the argument that the law favors
settling disputes that might otherwise result in complex and protracted litigation, a California
court has responded that "the deference to such settlements gives way ... to adherence to
basic trust law." Estate of Gilliland, 44 Cal. App. 3d 32, 40, 118 Cal. Rptr. 447, 452 (1974).
In some jurisdictions, will contest compromise agreements are regulated by statute. For
example, under Uniform Probate Code § 3-1102, the court shall approve such an agreement if
it finds that the contest is in good faith and that the effect of the agreement upon persons
represented by fiduciaries is just and reasonable. The statute makes no mention of the "mate-
rial purpose" requirement. See generally G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 1009, at
437-48 (termination by court approval of compromise proposed by parties to litigation).
111. See infra notes 120-35 & accompanying text.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 337, comment m; 4 R. Pow-
ELL, supra note 7, 567, at 428.54; 4 A. Scorr, supra note 3, § 337.4, at 2673-74.
113. Where the settlor's purposes are not expressed in the trust instrument, extrinsic evi-
dence of the surrounding circumstances is admissible in order to determine the purposes of the
trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 337 comment e. Professor Powell
advises that this is "a rule fraught with danger and is to be applied most sparingly." 4 R.
POWELL, supra note 7, 567, at 428.55.
114. 45 Cal. App. 2d 598, 114 P.2d 669 (1941).
115. The lack of a spendthrift clause was not an oversight. The settlor had told his attor-
ney "I understand spendthrift trusts, and I don't want a spendthrift trust. I want him [the
settlor's son and income beneficiary] to get the income. . . during his natural life. I want it so
he can't go around and beat his creditors. I want him to live an honest, upright life." Id. at
603, 114 P.2d at 672.
116. Id. at 604, 114 P.2d at 672.
117. Id. at 608, 114 P.2d at 674.
118. Id. at 607, 114 P.2d at 674.
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The major criticisms leveled against the Claflin doctrine are equally
applicable to the Easterday decision.1 19 Easterday reflects the paternalis-
tic attitude deplored by Gray; the holding necessarily would diminish the
marketability of the beneficial interest and ultimately could result in the
waste of the beneficial interest.
Spendthrift Trusts
Although the absence of a spendthrift clause is not a bar to the oper-
ation of the Claflin rule and other aspects of the material purpose doc-
trine, the mere existence of a spendthrift provision greatly strengthens
the case against premature termination. 120 The typical spendthrift provi-
sion, which restrains voluntary and involuntary alienation of the benefi-
cial interest by the beneficiary, indicates a clear intent on the part of the
settlor not only to provide for the beneficiary, but also to shield him from
his own improvidence. 121 Although serious policy questions have been
raised concerning the legality and morality of the spendthrift trust con-
cept,122 the spendthrift trust has gained wide acceptance in the United
States1 23 and is recognized in California by both statute and case law. 124
In the great majority of American jurisdictions that accept the
spendthrift trust doctrine, courts have held that the beneficiaries under
such a trust cannot compel termination, even though all are sui juris and
consent. This rule applies not only to trusts involving postponement of
enjoyment, but also to trusts for successive beneficiaries.25 For example,
in Estate of Leonardini v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.,1 26 both
the income beneficiary and the remainderman sought a partial termina-
tion of the trust. The court refused their request, noting that:
The testator set up this trust for the life of Mrs. Leonardini and pro-
vided that the total income should be paid to her for that period. To
protect her against herself, and to assure that this income should not
be depleted by her acts, he made this a spendthrift trust. It certainly
violates the spirit of the spendthrift [trust] provisions to permit Mrs.
Leonardini. .. to consent to its diminution-the very thing the testa-
119. See supra notes 99-104 & accompanying text.
120. According to Professor Scott, the most common application of the material purpose
doctrine involves spendthrift trust cases. 4 A. ScoTt, supra note 3, § 337.2, at 2664.
121. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 4, § 40, at 147.
122. See, e.g., J. GRAY, supra note 99, §§ 134-277; Scott, supra note 99, at 642-47.
123. See 2 A. Scor, supra note 3, § 152, at 1132-39.
124. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 859, 867 (West 1982); see Note, Trusts: Spendthrift Trusts in
California: Civil Code Sections 859 and 867. Planning and Construction of Spendthrift Provi-
sions, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 441 (1952).
125. 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 3, § 337.2, at 2664.
126. 131 Cal. App. 2d 9, 280 P.2d 81 (1955).
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tor tried to prevent by the spendthrift provision. 127
In certain exceptional cases the courts have departed from a strict
application of this rule or have found grounds for circumventing it. For
example, in Estate of Nicely, 2 8 the testator's will established a testamen-
tary trust directing that $250 per month be paid to the testator's daugh-
ter for life and that on her death the principal be paid to certain charities.
The trust was made spendthrift and included a provision giving the
trustee the power to invade the corpus in an emergency affecting the
daughter. A portion of the charitable remainder gift violated former Cal-
ifornia Probate Code section 41 and normally would have passed out-
right to the daughter under the intestacy laws. Because of the corpus
invasion power, however, neither the extent to which section 41 was vio-
lated nor how much should pass by intestacy could be determined. The
trial court held that distribution of the intestate portion would therefore
be delayed until the death of the daughter.
129
The appellate court sought and found a more practical result. The
simplest solution would involve direct termination of the trust, but this
was precluded by the spendthrift clause. The court indicated, however,
that the daughter could waive the corpus invasion provision. Upon
waiver, "the trust becomes nothing more than an annuity."1 30 The court
reasoned that although under the terms of the trust the charitable benefi-
ciaries were not to take until the death of the life beneficiary, the defer-
ment obviously was not for their benefit, but was only a consequence of
the life estate. The court concluded that the daughter could apply to the
probate court for the purchase of an annuity to pay her the $250 per
month, with the proviso that the annuity be inalienable and not subject
to creditors' claims or assignment. Once this was accomplished, continu-
ance of the trust would serve no further purpose; the trust would be
"dry" and "naked" and hence terminable.1
3'
Decisions such as Leonardini, refusing termination when the trust
contains a valid spendthrift provision, make more sense than Claflin and
related cases discussed previously. 32 As Professor Powell has noted,
"[t]he inalienability of the beneficiary's interest makes it inescapably
127. Id. at 14, 280 P.2d at 85. As an additional bar to termination, the court in Leonardini
also found that unborn beneficiaries had an interest in the corpus. Id. at 17, 280 P.2d at 87.
This problem is discussed infra notes 161-211 & accompanying text.
128. 235 Cal. App. 2d 174, 44 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1965).
129. Id. at 178, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 807-08.
130. Id. at 185, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
131. Id. at 186, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 812. For a discussion of other exceptional circumstances,
see infra notes 136-59 & accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 82-106 & accompanying text.
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clear that the trust's purposes would be frustrated by an early elimination
of the trust."
133
Furthermore, the spendthrift restraint operates not merely as strong
evidence of the settlor's material protective purpose, but also as an en-
forcement mechanism for that purpose. Thus, unlike the situation in
Claflin and Easterday, a decree denying termination in the spendthrift
trust cases cannot be circumvented by a sale of the beneficial interest. In
line with this reasoning, the material purpose rule, insofar as it relates to
spendthrift trusts, should be kept intact as a barrier to early termination.
Moreover, the limitations on termination inherent in the material pur-
pose rule should be coextensive with the validity of the spendthrift re-
strictions. To the extent that voluntary or involuntary alienation is
permitted despite the spendthrift restraint, termination by the beneficiary
should be allowed.'34 If the trust provides for the regular payment of a
specified sum to the income beneficiary for life, with a remainder over,
then the annuity solution adopted by the court in Estate of Nicely135
should be pursued. This type of solution would obviate the necessity of
continued trust administration during the lifetime of the income benefici-
ary and hence would be less costly.
Exigent Circumstances Justifying Modification: Distributive Deviation
It is well established that the court has the inherent equitable power
to authorize deviation from the express terms of a trust in order to effec-
tuate the underlying purpose of the settlor. 136 The question, then, is
under what circumstances and conditions the court will exercise this
133. 4 R. POWELL, supra note 7, % 567, at 428.53.
The purpose of such a [spendthrift] trust is to prevent voluntary or involuntary alien-
ation by the beneficiaries. To hold that it is valid means that the court will aid in
effecting the object of the settlor. It would be directly frustrating his purpose if the
court ended the trust and gave the principal to the beneficiaries so that they could sell
and their creditors could take their interests.
G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 1008, at 435-36.
134. This assumes, of course, that the other requisites for early termination are met, that
is, that all beneficiaries are sui juris and consent to the termination.
135. See supra notes 128-31 & accompanying text. It should be noted, however, that
courts are unwilling to substitute an annuity for a trust income interest without the express
consent of the life beneficiary. Thus, in Estate of Feuereisen, 17 Cal. App. 3d 717, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 165 (1971), where the trust provided that $270 per month should be paid to the settlor's
sister for life, and on her death, the trust assets were to be distributed to certain charities, the
court refused to authorize the purchase of a commercial annuity and termination of the trust
in the absence of the consent of the life beneficiary. Id. at 722, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 168. The court
also indicated that "good cause" must be shown for the purchase of an annuity and that the
saving of trustee's fees did not necessarily amount to good cause, particularly where the life
beneficiary apparently had objections to the substitution.
136. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 994, at 242. This power is analogous to the
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power. Initially, a distinction must be drawn between "administrative
deviation" and "distributive deviation." Courts frequently have permit-
ted the trustee to deviate from the administrative or management provi-
sions of the trust when unforeseen exigencies have arisen, authorizing the
trustee to sell property that otherwise would have to be retained1 37 or to
make investments that otherwise would be improper under the express
terms of the trust.1 38 Courts traditionally have been less willing to au-
thorize deviation from the distributive provisions of a trust. Two factors,
viewed previously in other contexts, provide a partial explanation for this
judicial attitude: the material purpose rule and the requirement of bene-
ficiary consent.
Under the guise of the material purpose doctrine, courts refuse to
allow modification of, or deviation from, the distributive provisions of a
trust if doing so would defeat a material purpose of the settlor. 139 In-
deed, deviation will be permitted only when the main purpose of the trust
is threatened. 14° If the settlor's primary purpose was to provide support
for the income beneficiary, and the income being generated by the trust is
insufficient to provide for basic support needs of such beneficiary, then
the main purpose of the trust is being impeded. In this situation, the
courts have been willing to grant relief by authorizing an invasion of
corpus if this can be accomplished without impairing the interests of
other beneficiaries. 141 For example, in Whittingham v. California Trust
cy pres doctrine applicable to charitable trusts. Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust
Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 763, 770, 310 P.2d 1010, 1015 (1957).
137. See, e.g., Adams v. Cook, 15 Cal. 2d 352, 101 P.2d 484 (1940); cf Security-First Nat'l
Bank v. Easter, 136 Cal. App. 691, 29 P.2d 422 (1934) (reversing trial court order directing
sale of property contrary to express terms of trust).
138. See, e.g., Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 94 N.H. 284, 51 A.2d 841 (1947); Lambert-
ville Nat'l Bank v. Bumster, 141 N.J. Eq. 396, 57 A.2d 525 (1948); see also, Haskell, Justifying
the Principle of Distributive Deviation in the Law of Trusts, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 267, 270-71
(1967). In more recent years some courts have been willing to authorize such deviation when
inflation has eroded the value of the trust corpus. It was thought that by freeing the trustees
from certain investment constraints contained in the trust instrument, the trust corpus could
be invested more productively, thereby allowing the trust to keep pace with inflation. Frolik,
Adjustment for Inflation for Fixed-Income Trust Beneficiaries, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 661,
689-92 (1979). Compare In re Trusteeship Under Agreement with Mayo, 259 Minn. 91, 105
N.W.2d 900 (1960) (permitting investment deviation due to the adverse inflationary impact)
with Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 763, 310 P.2d 1010
(1957) (finding that economic conditions were not grave enough to permit deviation).
139. See supra note 74 & accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Estate of Gilliland, 44 Cal. App. 3d 32, 118 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1974). The
court will authorize deviation from the terms of the trust when " 'owing to circumstances not
known to the settlor and not anticipated by him compliance would defeat or substantially
impair the . . . purposes of the trust' . . . . Unusual or emergent circumstances afford the
basis for deviation." Id. at 37, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 450 (citations omitted).
141. It has been suggested that there are four factors involved in determining whether
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Co., 14 2 the income beneficiary was at the time of execution of the trust in
good health and self-supporting. Later she became a chronic invalid, un-
able to earn her own living and unable to make the mortgage payments
on her house, which was under threat of foreclosure. Because she was
ultimately entitled to succeed to one-sixth of the trust corpus, the court
authorized invasion of that portion of the corpus, reasoning that no one
else had a beneficial interest in it.143
When the financial position of the income beneficiary is less precari-
ous, however, courts have denied deviation from the trust terms even
though the interests of other beneficiaries are protected. In Moxley v.
Title Insurance & Trust Co., 144 the majority concluded that the benefici-
ary had not demonstrated sufficient changed circumstances or an emer-
gency warranting deviation from the express terms of the trust: "[W]e
do not believe that a trust should be modified merely upon a showing of
the beneficiary's desire to purchase a home and a showing of the insuffi-
ciency of the beneficiary's income to make such a purchase .... ,,145
Even when it is conceded that the settlor's main purpose is to provide
support for the income beneficiary and that this purpose is threatened by
the insufficiency of income, courts disallow deviation for the benefit of
the income beneficiary if deviation will adversely affect the interests of
other beneficiaries; "this is true even though it appears that the income
beneficiary was the primary object of the settlor's bounty and that the
settlor would have desired such a payment."1 46  In Estate of Van Deu-
sen,14 7 the trust instrument provided that the trust income was to be paid
in equal shares to the settlor's two daughters, and on the death of the
survivor, the corpus was to be distributed to the settlor's grandchildren
or their issue. The trust produced only $200-$250 per month in total
income. The income beneficiaries petitioned the court to instruct the
trustee to pay each of them $200 per month out of income if sufficient,
but if not, out of the corpus of the trust. The income beneficiaries alleged
that the settlor had anticipated that the net income from the trust invest-
ments would be at least $400 per month, intending that not less than
deviation should be allowed: (1) the severity of the income beneficiary's financial need; (2) the
relationship between the income beneficiary and the settlor; (3) the existence of minor or un-
born remaindermen; and (4) whether a primary purpose of the settlor included the preserva-
tion of corpus for the remaindermen. Frolik, supra note 138, at 676-77.
142. 214 Cal. 128, 4 P.2d 142 (1931).
143. 1& at 134-35, 4 P.2d at 145.
144. 27 Cal. 2d 457, 165 P.2d 15 (1945); see supra notes 90-98 & accompanying text.
145. Id. at 468, 165 P.2d at 21.
146. Halbach, supra note 57, at 1426.
147. 30 Cal. 2d 285, 182 P.2d 565 (1947).
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$200 per month would be available for each daughter. One beneficiary
had an incurable disease needing special medical treatment, and the
other was wholly dependent upon the trust income for her support. The
trial court issued an order granting the beneficiaries' petition.
The California Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the set-
tlor's daughters had only an income interest and that the invasion of the
corpus without the consent of the remaindermen constituted an imper-
missible taking of the latter's property. 148 The court stated that
"[s]ympathy for the needs of the respondents [income beneficiaries] does
not empower the court to deprive the residuary beneficiaries of their in-
terests in the corpus of the trust without their consent ....
The court's decision in Van Deusen is supported by the substantial
weight of authority.1 50 On a few occasions, however, the courts have
evaded the import of this rule, either by gleaning an implied power to
invade the corpus from the terms of the trust, or by liberalizing the con-
sent requirement.I5I In the controversial case of Petition of Wolcott, 152
the court did both. The testator left his residuary estate in trust, di-
recting that the income be paid to his widow for life; on her death, the
principal was to be distributed to the settlor's then living issue, or in
default of issue, to the settlor's heirs at law. The testator was survived by
his widow, two sons, and an eighteen year old grandson. The annual
income generated by the trust was approximately $2300. The widow was
eighty-two years of age, ill and infirm, and the income was insufficient to
afford her adequate subsistence. The trustee sought authorization to in-
vade principal up to the sum of $4000 a year for the purpose of providing
the widow with reasonable support. The testator's children and
grandchild consented to the invasion. 153 The New Hampshire court au-
thorized the deviation. The court first noted that "[a]lthough not ex-
pressly stated, the testator's purpose that during her life, his wife should
have the beneficial use of his entire estate . . . is readily apparent."' 154
The court recognized that the trust instrument contained no power to
invade the corpus for the widow's benefit, but "[o]n the other hand, such
148. Id. at 293, 182 P.2d at 571.
149. Id. at 295, 182 P.2d at 573.
150. Haskell, supra note 138, at 277.
151. Halbach, supra note 57, at 1427.
152. 95 N.H. 23, 56 A.2d 641 (1948), noted in Note, Trusts-Deviation from Terms of a
Trust, 28 B.U.L. REv. 387 (1948); 47 MICH. L. REv. 422 (1949).
153. The grandson was represented by a guardian ad litem, who also represented the possi-
ble interests of persons as yet unborn. Wolcott, 95 N.H. at 25, 56 A.2d at 642.
154. Id. at 25, 56 A.2d at 642.
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use [was] not specifically forbidden."'1 55 The court concluded that be-
cause the testator's intent to support his widow was implicit in his will,
the interests of the remaindermen were necessarily secondary to his, and
they took subject to the execution of that intent: "The remaindermen are
deprived of no rights so long as rights which the life tenant was intended
to have are not exceeded."' 156 The court, emphasizing the living remain-
dermen's consent to the modification, indicated that the interests of un-
born contingent remaindermen were sufficiently represented.
57
The decision in Wolcott engendered some controversy; although
Professor Scott commented favorably, 58 Professor Niles likened the
New Hampshire court to Robin Hood and his band of merry men.'
59
The problem inherent in cases such as Van Deusen and Wolcott, i.e., the
taking of property from remaindermen for the benefit of the income ben-
eficiary, would be greatly alleviated if the consent of all beneficiaries, par-
ticularly unborn or unascertained remaindermen, were more easily
obtainable. Possible solutions to this problem are explored below. 6°
Consent of All Beneficiaries
Even when the material purpose doctrine does not bar termina-
tion-such as when the settlor is alive and consents to an early termina-
tion of the trust 161 or when no material purpose would be served by the
155. Id at 25, 56 A.2d at 643.
156. Id at 27, 56 A.2d at 644.
157. Id at 27-28, 56 A.2d at 644. The latter point is open to question. The court was
apparently relying on the doctrine of virtual representation. Although the interests of the
unborn beneficiaries were represented by the guardian ad litem, the guardian apparently con-
sented to the proposed modification without extracting any quid pro quo. Under the standard
applied by most courts, this is not adequate representation. See infra notes 212-20 & accompa-
nying text.
158. 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 168, it 1294-95. For other generally favorable discus-
sions of the Wolcott case, see Haskell, supra note 138, at 277-81; Note, Variation of Private
Trusts in Response to Unforeseen Needs of Beneficiaries: Proposals for Reform, 47 B.U.L. Rlv.
567, 582-88 (1967).
159. In reviewing the second edition of Scott's treatise, Professor Niles commented:
[Although Professor Scott would like to have the law developed in a more liberal
fashion. . . , it does not seem to this reviewer that a judge has the power to ex-
change his robes of black for Lincoln green, and to take from the remainderman and
give to the income beneficiary. The doctrine of deviation does not justify the court in
playing favorites, even though in certain cases the dead hand would probably
applaud.
Niles, Book Review, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 886, 893 (1957) (reviewing A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS (1956)).
160. See infra text accompanying notes 194-263.
161. It is well established that termination will be permitted if the settlor and all benefi-
ciaries desire it, even though the purposes of the trust have not been totally fulfilled. Heifetz v.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 776, 785, 305 P.2d 979, 985 (1957);
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continuance of the trust 162-- the ability of the beneficiaries to compel ter-
mination may be impeded by the further requirement that the consent of
all beneficiaries be obtained.
It is essential that all living beneficiaries consent to the proposed
termination. 163 Even if all the living beneficiaries are amenable to termi-
nation, however, the presence of unborn or unascertained beneficiaries
whose consent cannot be obtained may preclude termination of the trust.
The unborn beneficiary problem arises in two broad factual contexts:
when the settlor of the trust claims to be the sole beneficiary; and when
the living beneficiaries claim to be the sole beneficiaries. The following
section analyzes each of these categories and explores solutions to the
various problems involving unborn or unascertained beneficiaries.
Settlor as Sole Beneficiary
If the trust settlor is the sole beneficiary, he may compel termination
of the trust, even though the trust is stated to be irrevocable or spend-
thrift.164 In many cases, however, it is difficult to determine whether or
not the settlor is the sole beneficiary. If the settlor establishes a trust to
pay himself the income for a certain period of time, and at the end of that
period, to pay the principal to him, he is clearly the sole beneficiary.
165
Similarly, if the settlor is the trust income beneficiary and at his death the
principal is to be paid to his estate or personal representative, he is re-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUsTs, supra note 2, § 338(1); 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 338,
at 2687-88. Similarly, if the settlor is himself the sole beneficiary and desires to end the trust
prematurely, termination will be allowed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2,
§ 339; 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 3, § 339, at 2694; Note, supra note 103, at 1015.
162. See, e.g., Estate of Gallimore, 99 Cal. App. 2d 664, 222 P.2d 259 (1950).
163. See, e.g., Estate of Feuereisen, 17 Cal. App. 3d 717, 722-23, 95 Cal. Rptr. 165, 168
(1971) (holding that the consent of the life beneficiary was necessary for termination of the
trust); Estate of Gallimore, 99 Cal. App. 2d 664, 667, 222 P.2d 259, 261 (1950) (holding that
the trust could not be terminated over the objections of one remainderman, even though all
beneficiaries were competent adults and all other beneficiaries, including three remaindermen
and the income beneficiary, consented to termination).
164. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 1004, at 375-76; Report of Committee
on Modification, Revocation and Termination of Trusts, supra note 31, at 304. The only juris-
diction deviating from this rule is Kentucky. 4 R. POWELL, supra note 7, 566, at 428.40(5).
The underlying rationale for this rule is that because no one other than the settlor has any
beneficial interest in the property, he should be permitted to do with it as he pleases, so long as
he is not under any legal incapacity. The interest of the trustee in continuing fees is not suffi-
cient to prevent termination of the trust. See Evans, supra note 79, at 1072. The major argu-
ment against the rule is that if the settlor has created a trust for his own protection, he should
not be permitted later in a moment of folly to deprive himself of that protection. Professor
Scott responds: "Even though in a moment of folly he has created a trust ... there is no
reason why he should not later in a moment of wisdom revoke the trust." 4 A. Scorr, supra
note 3, § 339, at 2699.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 127 comment b.
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garded as the sole beneficiary.
166
In contrast, if the settlor is the trust income beneficiary and at his
death the principal is to be distributed to his "children," his "issue," or
his "descendants," courts generally hold that the settlor is not the sole
beneficiary and that an equitable remainder interest has been created in
his children, issue, or descendants, whether or not the latter are in
existence.1
67
In Levy v. Crocker-Citizens National Bank,168 the settlor executed
two identical instruments, each providing that he was to receive the net
income for his life; on his death the trust corpus was to be distributed
pursuant to his exercise of a general testamentary power of appointment,
or, in the absence of such appointment, to his then surviving issue. The
trusts were irrevocable. 169 Six years later, the settlor sought to terminate
the trusts on the ground that he should be considered the sole benefici-
ary. The California Court of Appeal rejected his argument, reasoning
that a gift to issue indicated an intent to create an interest in a special
class of persons and not to provide merely for succession by the general
class of persons who would take at the settlor's death under the intestacy
laws. 170
A more difficult constructional question is presented when the trust
provides that the settlor is to receive the income during his life, and on
his death the principal is to be distributed to his heirs. This problem has
166. Woodruff v. Trust Co., 233 Ga. 135, 137-38, 210 S.E.2d 321, 323 (1974); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 127 comment b; see Browder, Trusts and the
Doctrine of Estates, 72 MICH. L. Rnv. 1509, 1524 (1974). If the settlor is the income benefici-
ary and the trust contains no provision for the distribution of principal at his death, the settlor
is regarded as the sole beneficiary because the trustee will hold a resulting trust for him or his
estate. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 127 comment b.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 127 comment b; 2 A. Scorr,
supra note 3, § 127.1, at 986-87.
168. 14 Cal. App. 3d 102, 94 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
169. The settlor executed the trust instruments when he was 21 years of age, apparently at
his mother's insistence. He testified that he did not realize that the documents were trust
instruments until his mother's death six years later. The court acknowledged that it saw no
logical reason for the creation of the irrevocable trusts and that the tax consequences were
severe, but indicated that the settlor's testimony, although relevant in an action to rescind the
trust on the ground of mistake or undue influence, had no bearing on the question of termina-
tion, Le., whether he intended to make a gift to anyone. Id. at 104-05, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 2-3.
170. Id. at 105-06, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 3-4. The settlor further argued that because he had a
will, it was unlikely that he would die intestate and hence there was little likelihood that any-
one would take in default of the exercise of the power of appointment. The existence of the
power indicated an intent to not make a gift to those who would take in default of the exercise
of the power. The court indicated that it was constrained by precedent to reject this argument.
Id. at 107, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
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arisen in several California cases over the years, but there is currently no
satisfactory resolution.
In Gray v. Union Trust Co., 17 1 the settlor executed an irrevocable
trust instrument which provided that she was to receive the net income
during her life and upon her death the trust property was to be distrib-
uted "as she shall provide in her last will and testament, and leaving no
last will and testament, said property shall go to and vest in her heirs at
law, according to the laws of succession of the state of California as such
laws now exist."' 172 The settlor was unmarried and had no children or
other lineal descendants. The trial court, agreeing with the settlor that
she was the only person having any interest in the trust property, granted
her request for termination. The California Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the trust provision created a remainder in the settlor's
heirs. 173 The court relied on Civil Code section 779, under which "the
term 'heirs' is changed from a word of limitation to one of purchase, and
becomes a specific designation of a class which will have the right to the
property upon the termination of the life estate."' 174 The court also in-
ferred intent to create a remainder from the provision that the settlor's
heirs were to be determined under the succession laws in existence at the
time of the trust's creation: "[B]y a change in the laws of succession,
conceivably it could happen that those who would be entitled to take
under the trust instrument. . . would no one of them be an heir at law
of Helen Gray at the time of her death."'175 The court concluded that
because a remainder had been created in the settlor's heirs and they were
171. 171 Cal. 637, 154 P. 306 (1915), noted in Comment, Trusts: Power to Revoke in
Absence of an Express Power of Revocation, 4 CALIF. L. REv. 354 (1916).
172. 171 Cal. at 639, 154 P. at 307.
173. Id. at 642, 154 P. at 309.
174. Id. at 648, 154 P. at 311 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 779). Civil Code § 779 abolishes
the Rule in Shelley's Case. CAL. CIV. CODE § 779 (West 1982). "The effect of the repeal of
this arbitrary rule is to restore to courts of equity their right to construe this language. . . in
accordance with its plain import and intent." Gray, 171 Cal. at 644, 154 P. at 309. The court's
discussion of the Rule in Shelley's Case and its reliance on § 779 are somewhat inapposite
because the limitation in the instant case was not technically within the scope of the rule. The
Rule in Shelley's Case contemplates a remainder in the heirs of the grantee and not a limitation
in favor of the heirs of the grantor, as was the case in Gray. Comment, supra note 171, at 355;
see Scott, Revoking a Trust: Recent Legislative Simplification, 65 HARV. L. REv. 617, 619
(1952); Note, Revocation of Trust by Consent of the Beneficiaries, 36 IND. L.J. 76, 80-81, 83
n.43 (1960); Comment, The Worthier Title Doctrine in California, 1 STAN. L. REv. 774, 778
(1949); Case Note, Real Property-Trusts- Doctrine of Worthier Title Applicable as a Rule of
Construction to Allow Settlor to Terminate Trust Where Remainder Limited to His Heirs, 22 S.
CAL. L. REv. 497, 499 (1949). Furthermore, it is probable that Civil Code § 779 was intended
to apply only to real property, and the trust in Gray consisted of both realty and personalty.
See Comment, supra, at 778-79.
175. Gray, 171 Cal. at 640, 154 P. at 308.
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not before the court, termination of the trust necessarily had to be
denied.
176
The decision in Gray was followed in Bixby v. Hotchkis.177 In
Hotchkis the settlor had established an irrevocable trust with a twenty
year duration. At the end of the twenty year period, the trustees were to
distribute the trust property to the settlor if he was then living, and if not,
to his "heirs at law in accordance with the laws of succession of the State
of California then in effect." 178 Six years after the execution of the trust
instrument, the settlor sought to terminate the trust, contending that he
was the sole trust beneficiary. The trial court's decision denying termina-
tion was affirmed on appeal: "One who creates a voluntary trust is not
the sole beneficiary if he manifests an intention to create a contingent
interest in others, such as his heirs at law." 179 The appellate court con-
cluded that such a contingent interest had been created. 180
Neither the Gray nor the Hotchkis court considered the possible ap-
plication of the doctrine of worthier title.181 The doctrine figured promi-
nently, however, in Bixby v. California Trust Co., 182 decided by the
California Supreme Court in 1949. Bixby involved an irrevocable trust
under which the income was to be paid to the settlor for life, and upon
his death, the trust property was to be distributed to the settlor's "heirs
at law in accordance with the laws of succession of the State of California
then in effect." 18 3 The trial court denied the settlor's application for ter-
mination, apparently relying on Gray and Hotchkis. The California
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the settlor was the sole beneficiary
176. Id. at 641-42, 154 P. at 308-09.
177. 58 Cal. App. 2d 445, 136 P.2d 597 (1943).
178. Id. at 449-50, 136 P.2d at 599.
179. Id. at 451-52, 136 P.2d at 600-01.
180. The court relied primarily on Gray v. Union Trust Co. in making this determination.
Id. The court, however, did not discuss the possible distinction between Gray and the instant
case. The heirs in Gray were to be determined under the intestacy laws in effect at the creation
of the trust, whereas the heirs in Hotchkis were to be determined under the succession laws in
effect at the time of termination. In both cases, however, the class of heirs taking under the
terms of the trust could be different from those who would take at the settlor's death under the
laws of intestate succession.
181. The doctrine of worthier title, simply stated, provides that a limitation in favor of the
grantor's heirs creates a reversion in the grantor and no interest in the heirs. The court in
Bixby v. Hotchkis did cite a comment in the Restatement of Trusts which contained a cross-
reference to the section dealing with the worthier title doctrine, but the court did not directly
mention the doctrine. Hotchkis, 58 Cal. App. 2d at 451-52, 136 P.2d at 600-01; see Verrall,
The Doctrine of Worthier Title. A Questionable Rule of Construction, 6 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 371,
391 (1959).
182. 33 Cal. 2d 495, 202 P.2d 1018 (1949).
183. Id. at 497, 202 P.2d at 1018.
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of the trust and therefore could compel termination. 18 4 To achieve this
result, the court resorted to the doctrine of worthier title, 85 which pro-
vides that a limitation in favor of the grantor's heirs creates a reversion in
the grantor and no interest in his heirs.
1 86
Relying on the landmark opinion of Justice Cardozo in Doctor v.
Hughes,187 the court indicated that this rule should be regarded as a rule
of construction and hence applicable unless a contrary intention of the
settlor is manifested. Therefore, if a trust instrument directs that the
income should be paid to the settlor for life, and on his death the princi-
pal is to be distributed to his heirs, no remainder interests are created.
The settlor is the sole beneficiary, owning a reversionary interest in the
trust corpus. 188 The court distinguished the earlier decisions in Gray and
Hotchkis on the ground that in those cases, the settlor intended to create
an interest in a special class of persons, and not simply, as in Bixby, to
provide for succession by the general class of persons who would take at
death under the intestacy laws.
189
184. Id. at 497-99, 202 P.2d at 1019-20.
185. Id. at 498, 202 P.2d at 1019.
186. The worthier title doctrine originally consisted of two separate branches, one appli-
cable to devises and the other to inter vivos conveyances. Under the first, a devise to a person
who was also the heir of the testator had no effect; the person took as the heir and not under
the will. The second rule rendered a limitation in an inter vivos conveyance to the heirs of the
grantor void. The purpose underlying both rules was the same: to maximize the feudal inci-
dents of relief, wardship, and marriage. When the feudal system fell into obsolescence, both
aspects of the doctrine were eventually abolished in England. L. SIMES, THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS § 26, at 56-57 (2d ed. 1966); Verrall, supra note 181. The rule relating to wills
never had much impact in the United States, but the inter vivos aspect of the doctrine gained
wide acceptance, though more as a rule of construction than as a rule of law. Id.
187. 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919). Doctor v. Hughes involved an irrevocable inter
vivos trust in land with the income payable to the settlor and an express remainder in the
settlor's heirs. The issue did not involve termination of the trust but whether the creditors of
the remaindermen could reach any interest in the trust property. The court held that no re-
mainder interest had been created. Id. at 309, 122 N.E. at 221. The court recognized that
"[t]here may be times ... when a reference to the heirs of the grantor will be regarded as the
gift of a remainder, and will vest title in the heirs presumptive," but indicated that this was not
one of those times. "[T]o transform into a remainder what would ordinarily be a reversion, the
intention to work the transformation must be clearly expressed. Here there is no clear expres-
sion of such a purpose." Id. at 312, 122 N.E. at 222. The court concluded that this rule of
construction most closely approximates the presumed interest of most settlors: "No one is heir
to the living, and seldom do the living mean to forego the power of disposition during life by
the direction that upon death there shall be a transfer to their heirs." Id. at 313, 122 N.E. at
223.
The constructional principle developed in Doctor v. Hughes is generally accepted and has
been adopted by the Restatement of Trusts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note
2, § 127 comment b. Nevertheless, it has been the subject of much litigation. See 1 A. ScoTr,
supra note 3, § 127.1, at 989-94 nn. 6-13.
188. Bixby, 33 Cal. 2d at 497, 202 P.2d at 1019.
189. Id. at 499, 202 P.2d at 1020.
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The decision in Bixby v. California Trust Co. was met with mixed
reviews, 1 90 and in 1959 the doctrine of worthier title was statutorily abol-
ished.1 91 California Civil Code section 1073 currently provides in perti-
nent part:
The law of this State does not include (1) the common law rule of
worthier title that a grantor cannot convey an interest to his own heirs
or (2) a presumption or rule of interpretation that a grantor does not
intend, by a grant to his own heirs or next of kin, to transfer an interest
to them.1
92
This statute precludes resort to construction to solve the question of
terminating a trust when the settlor is the income beneficiary with a re-
mainder in his heirs. Other possible solutions are explored below. 193
The Living Beneficiaries as Sole Beneficiaries
Even if all living beneficiaries are competent and consent, and there
is no other bar to termination, the existence of unborn or unascertained
beneficiaries may preclude an early termination of the trust. On occasion
the living beneficiaries may seek to establish that they are the sole benefi-
ciaries, despite an apparent contingent limitation in favor of unborn or
unascertained persons.194 The constructional problems in these cases are
similar to those in the preceding section.
If a future interest under a trust is limited to the heirs of the income
beneficiary, it is possible that the settlor intended to create an equitable
fee interest in the named beneficiary. 195 Some courts have achieved this
result by application of the Rule in Shelley's Case.196 The California
190. Compare Comment, supra note 174 and Case Note, supra note 174 (supporting the
decision) with Verrall, supra note 181, at 389-97, 400-02 (arguing for the abolition of the doc-
trine of worthier title).
191. Act of Apr. 17, 1959, ch. 122, § 1, 1959 Cal. Stat. 2005 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1073 (West 1982)); id. § 2, at 2006 (codified at CAL. PROB. CODE § 109 (West Supp. 1984)).
Effective Jan. 1, 1985, Probate Code § 109 was replaced by Probate Code § 6145. Act of Sept.
15, 1983, ch. 842, § 55, 1983 West's Legis. Serv. 4497.
192. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1073 (West 1982).
193. See infra notes 212-63 & accompanying text.
194. Many of the cases in this area involve the question of whether those consenting
to the termination in fact hold all the beneficial interests in the trust. Often the
answer hinges on whether the gift of the remainder is phrased in such a way that
under traditional rules of property the life tenant has a fee simple.
Wright, supra note 35, at 922.
195. "Remainder to the 'heirs' of the life tenant may give him a fee." Id. at n.32.
196. See, e.g., Fowler v. Lanpher, 193 Wash. 308, 75 P.2d 132 (1938). Under the Rule in
Shelley's Case, if the beneficial interest under a trust of land is limited to a person for life and
to his heirs in remainder, he receives an equitable interest in fee, his heirs having no interest.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 127 comment c. This obviates the ne-
cessity of obtaining the consent of those who would otherwise have interests as the "heirs" of
the life beneficiary. 4 R. POWELL, supra note 7, 566, at 428.41 n.9. Some courts have gone
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courts, however, have consistently rejected this argument, 197 relying pri-
marily on Civil Code section 779 which abolishes the Rule in Shelley's
Case and provides that
[w]hen a remainder is limited to the heirs. . . of a person to whom a
life estate in the same property is given, the persons who, on termina-
tion of the life estate are the successors or heirs . . . of the owner for
life, are entitled to take by virtue of the remainder so limited to them,
and not as mere successors of the owner for life. 198
Even when section 779 has no application, the courts have tended to
view the term "heirs" as a word of purchase. For example, in Estate of
Leonardini v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.,199 the trust instru-
ment provided that the income was to be paid to the settlor's god-daugh-
ter for her life, and on her death, the principal was to be paid to her son
"Bradford E. Panish, or his heirs. ' '200 Both the income beneficiary and
the son desired and consented to a partial termination of the trust. The
court indicated that the heirs of the son had a contingent remainder in
the corpus, that they took by purchase and not descent, and that their
consent was therefore indispensable.
20 1
When the class designation has been more specific, such as "issue,"
"descendants," or "children," the California courts uniformly have held
that unborn or unascertained class members have a beneficial interest
necessitating their consent for termination of the trust.20 2 The courts
have reached this result despite the improbability, if not impossibility,
that such class members will ever come into existence. In Fletcher v. Los
Angeles Trust & Savings Bank,20 3 the trust income was to be paid to the
even further, and have held "issue" to mean "heirs" for the purpose of applying the Rule in
Shelley's case. See, e.g., Mylin v. Hurst, 259 Pa. 77, 102 A. 429 (1917); Baxter v. Early, 131
S.C. 374, 127 S.E. 607 (1925). On occasion, the designation "children" has been interpreted as
"heirs" for the purposes of the rule. See, e.g., Simpson v. Reed, 205 Pa. 53, 54 A. 499 (1903).
See generally Comment, Revocation of an Inter-vivos Trust-Who Must Consent, 2 WAYNE L.
REV. 34, 36-37 (1955) (application of the Rule in Shelley's Case).
197. See, e.g., Wogman v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 657,
665, 267 P.2d 423, 428 (1954) (holding that the heirs of the income beneficiary were a pres-
ently unascertainable group, having an interest in the corpus of the trust by purchase and not
by descent).
198. CAL. CIV. CODE § 779 (West 1982).
199. 131 Cal. App. 2d 9, 280 P.2d 81 (1955).
200. Id. at 10, 280 P.2d at 83.
201. Id. at 15-17, 280 P.2d at 86-87.
202. See, e.g., Estate of Madison, 26 Cal. 2d 453, 159 P.2d 630 (1945); Fletcher v. Los
Angeles Trust & Sav. Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 187 P. 425 (1920); Woestman v. Union Trust & Sav.
Bank, 50 Cal. App. 604, 195 P. 944 (1920).
203. 182 Cal. 177, 187 P. 425 (1920). For criticism of Fletcher, see Turrentine, Suggestions
for Revision of the California Civil Code Regarding Future Interests, 21 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 26-
28 (1932). See also Comment, Property: Termination of a Trust: Meaning of Gift Over to
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settlor's daughter for life, and on her death, the trust fund was to be
distributed in equal shares to her children. The income beneficiary had
one child, and both desired termination of the trust. The parties claimed
that because of the age and sterility of the income benficiary, she could
bear no more children, and that therefore she and her son represented
the only possible beneficiaries under the trust. The trial court so found
and rendered a decree terminating the trust.
The California Supreme Court reversed. The court noted that the
case was outside the purview of the Claflin doctrine,2° 4 and hence the
only issue was whether all those holding beneficial interests in the trust
were before the court.205 Determination of this issue was dependent on
the admissibility of testimony as to the age and sterility of the income
beneficiary. The court held such evidence inadmissible, relying on the
conclusive presumption that a woman is capable of bearing children as
long as she lives. 206 Although this rule is of English common-law origin,
the English courts have departed from it, and trusts have been termi-
nated in England upon the presumption that a woman has ceased to have
childbearing capacity. 20 7 The California Supreme Court, however, felt
constrained to follow the so-called American rule establishing a conclu-
sive presumption of fertility.208 In support of its decision, the court
stated: "We are the more ready to do this, as such an interpretation can
wrong no one and the result of such a rule is merely to enforce the clearly
expressed intention of the trustor, and is more in accord with the Ameri-
can law concerning trusts in personalty. ' 2°9
The Fletcher rule was followed in Wogman v. Wells Fargo Bank &
Union Trust Co. 2 10 In Wogman the court stated that although the in-
come beneficiary had only one child who consented to the termination,
and was "nearly 58, so that the probability of having any more children
is extremely remote. . . such a legal possibility exists.
211
In summary, the problem of trust termination becomes particularly
acute when the terms of the trust include provisions in favor of the heirs,
issue, descendants, or children of a living person. The constructional
"Children" Are Adopted Children Included?, 7 CALIF. L. REv. 353 (1919) (discussing the
since vacated Court of Appeal decision in Fletcher).
204. See supra notes 82-88 & accompanying text.
205. Fletcher, 182 Cal. at 179-80, 187 P. at 426.
206. Id. at 180-84, 187 P. at 426-28.
207. Id. at 182, 187 P. at 427.
208. Id. at 184-85, 187 P. at 428.
209. Id.
210. 123 Cal. App. 2d 657, 267 P.2d 423 (1954).
211. Id. at 665, 267 P.2d at 428-29.
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preferences, coupled with the conclusive presumption of fertility, gener-
ally result in a determination that these unborn or unascertained persons
have a sufficient beneficial interest requiring their consent for termina-
tion. The following section outlines some possible solutions to the un-
born beneficiary problem.
Solutions to the Unborn Beneficiary Problem
In addition to the resurrection of the doctrine of worthier title and
the Rule in Shelley's Case, various devices have been developed to miti-
gate the problems engendered by the presence of unborn beneficiaries.
These include the doctrine of virtual representation, the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, statutes limiting the consent requirement, and abroga-
tion of the conclusive presumption of fertility.
Virtual Representation
Under the doctrine of virtual representation, the unborn members of
a class of beneficiaries may be represented by the living members of the
same class or by those having substantially similar interests so as to effec-
tively protect the interests of the unborn. The theory underlying the doc-
trine rests on the similarity of economic interest between the unborn
members and the living representatives. Courts assume that in pursuing
his own self-interest, the representative will effectively safeguard the in-
terests of those whom he represents.2 12 The doctrine has been used in at
least one California case in the trust termination context.
In Mabry v. Scott,2 13 the settlor established an irrevocable inter vivos
trust, naming himself, his spouse, and their four minor children as in-
come beneficiaries. On the death of the survivor of these six individuals,
the principal was to go first to the living issue of the settlor's four chil-
dren, or contingently, in the event of their death, to living spouses of the
four children; in the event that no issue or spouses survived, the principal
was to go to the heirs of the settlor. Shortly after establishing this trust,
the settlor was divorced; he eventually remarried and had another child.
He later brought suit to cancel the trust, alleging fraud and undue influ-
ence on the part of his former wife. This suit ultimately was settled by a
compromise agreement, under which the settlor and his former wife
212. Rodman & Rodman, Virtual Representation: Some Possible Extensions, 6 REAL
PROP. & PROB. & TR. L.J. 281 (1971); Note, Trust Termination and Unborn Beneficiaries, 29
OHIO ST. L.J. 741, 742 (1968).
213. 51 Cal. App. 2d 245, 124 P.2d 659 (1942).
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would each receive $60,000 from the trust corpus; 2 14 in addition, various
modifications were made in the income payments. The trustee, however,
objected to the settlement, contending that the unborn contingent re-
maindermen (the issue of the settlor's children) were indispensable par-
ties whose rights were adversely affected. 215 The trial court found that
the compromise was fair and equitable, and ordered modification of the
trust. The compromise was upheld on appeal. The appellate court rea-
soned that "there was virtual representation of the unborn contingent
remaindermen by the living children. '216 The court determined that
there was no adverse interest between the living children and their issue
which would prevent the living children from effectively protecting the
rights of the unborn contingent remaindermen. 217 Furthermore, the un-
born remaindermen and the living children were protected by the ap-
pointment of guardians ad litem.21 8 The court concluded that the
inability to bring unborn beneficiaries "before the tribunal" should not
preclude the rights of the living from being adjudicated.
219
The Mabry case did not involve total termination of the trust, but
merely a modification resulting in a partial termination. Furthermore,
the modification was produced by a settlement of a case that could con-
ceivably have resulted in cancellation of the trust, thereby eliminating the
interests of all beneficiaries, including those of the unborn remaindermen.
In this situation, the interests of the living and unborn beneficiaries were
substantially similar. Frequently, however, when termination of a trust
is sought, the interests of the living and the unborn beneficiaries are dia-
metrically opposed.220 Thus, the doctrine of virtual representation is of
limited utility in the trust termination context. The guardian ad litem
device, although similar in concept to the representation doctrine, would
214. The trust fund as originally constituted had a value of $1,350,000. Id at 247, 124
P.2d at 660.
215. Id. at 251, 124 P.2d at 662.
216. Id. at 253, 124 P.2d at 663.
217. Id at 255, 124 P.2d at 665. The absence of "hostility" between the interests of the
representative and those of the unborn is a prerequisite to application of the virtual representa-
tion doctrine. 2A R. POWELL, supra note 7, 296, at 581. Hostility exists when the grant of
the relief requested would destroy the interests limited to the unborn person. Id. at 581-82.
218. Mabry, 51 Cal. App. 2d at 256, 124 P.2d at 665.
219. Id. at 252-53, 124 P.2d at 663.
220. "Where, then, the interest of the unborn is derived from the trust instrument the
representation doctrine is inapplicable for one who might represent the unborn in many cases
involving trusts would here be destroying the interest of those represented and not protecting
it." Comment, Revocation of "Irrevocable" Trusts, 6 FORDHAM L. RaV. 242, 253 (1937); see
also 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1552, 1557-58 (1966) (suggesting that appointment of a guardian ad
litem affords more substantial protection for the interests of the unborn than reliance upon
representation by living beneficiaries).
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seem to afford greater flexibility and also greater protection to those
represented.
Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem
The guardian ad litem concept involves the appointment by the
court of a person to represent a party who is under a disability.221 The
use of the guardian ad litem in the trust termination context came to the
fore in the celebrated case of Hatch v. Riggs National Bank,222 when a
federal court suggested the appointment of a guardian ad litem as an
alternative to the doctrine of worthier title.
In Hatch, the settlor executed an irrevocable spendthrift trust, re-
serving to herself the income for life and directing that on her death the
principal was to be paid pursuant to her appointment by will, or in de-
fault of appointment, to her next of kin under the District of Columbia
intestacy laws then in effect. Thereafter, the settlor sought a partial ter-
mination of the trust,223 claiming that she was the sole beneficiary and
therefore could revoke or modify the trust under accepted principles of
trust law. The doctrine of worthier title was invoked to support this con-
tention. The court of appeal rejected the settlor's arguments in this re-
spect.224  The court noted the feudal origins of the doctrine, but
recognized that the doctrine had won widespread acceptance as a rule of
construction following Justice Cardozo's opinion in Doctor v. Hughes.
225
The court also observed that while the weight of authority supported
retention of the doctrine as a rule of construction, "there has been sub-
stantial and increasing opposition to the doctrine. '226 The court con-
cluded that retention of the doctrine was "pernicious in several
respects." 22
7
First, the court questioned whether the doctrine corresponded with
the intent of the average settlor. Although the dominant purpose of the
settlor may well be to benefit himself as the income beneficiary during his
life, a subsidiary but still significant purpose may be the satisfaction of a
natural desire to benefit his heirs or next of kin.228 In addition, the court
221. Note, supra note 212, at 744.
222. 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
223. The settlor desired an additional $5000 per year to be paid from the trust corpus in
order "to accomodate recently incurred expenses, and to live more nearly in accordance with
her refined but yet modest tastes." Id. at 561 (quoting Complaint).
224. Id.
225. 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
226. Hatch, 361 F.2d at 563.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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noted that although the presumption of a reversion is rebuttable by evi-
dence of a contrary intent, interpretation of the often murky signals of
such intent has resulted in "a shower of strained decisions difficult to
reconcile with one another and generative of considerable confusion in
the law."' 229 The court indicated its unwillingness "to plunge the District
of Columbia into the ranks of those jurisdictions bogged in the morass of
exploring, under the modem doctrine of worthier title, 'the almost
ephemeral qualities which go to prove the necessary intent.' "230 In re-
jecting the worthier title doctrine, the court concluded that treating the
settlor's heirs like any other remaindermen would effectuate the intent of
most settlors and would lead to less litigation, greater predictability, and
easier drafting.231
The problem with treating the settlor's heirs "like any other remain-
dermen" is that their consent is necessary to a termination or a modifica-
tion of the trust by the settlor. To alleviate this problem, the court in
Hatch proposed the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the
interests of the heirs for purposes of consent to modification or revoca-
tion.232 The court noted that although the persons whose interests the
guardian ad litem would represent are unascertainable as individuals,
they are identifiable as a class and their interests are therefore recogniza-
ble.233 The court suggested that the settlor seeking to revoke or modify
the trust "supplement his appeal to equity with a quid pro quo offered to
the heirs for their consent. '234 In the instant case, such consideration
229. Id. As an example of this confusion, the court pointed to the varying inferences that
could be drawn from the settlor's reservation of a testamentary power of appointment which, if
exercised, could defeat the interest of the heirs. The inclusion of such a power could be viewed
as buttressing the presumption of a reversion by indicating that the settlor intended to retain
control over the property. On the other hand, many courts have reasoned that the retention of
a testamentary power of appointment confirms the intent to create a remainder in the heirs,
because the settlor would not have retained the power unless he believed he was creating a
remainder interest. Id. at 564.
The Restatement takes a middle ground on the issue:
If. .. he reserves power to appoint by will alone, and in default of appointment the
property is to be conveyed to his heirs or next of kin, this is some indication that he
intended to confer an interest upon his heirs or next of kin which they could be
deprived of only by a testamentary appointment, but this is not of itself sufficient to
overcome the inference that he intended to give them no such interest but intended to
be the sole beneficiary of the trust.
RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS, supra note 2, § 127 comment b.
230. Hatch, 361 F.2d at 564 (quoting In re Burchell's Estate, 299 N.Y. 351, 361, 87
N.E.2d 293, 297 (1949)).
231. Hatch, 361 F.2d at 564.
232. Id. at 565.
233. Id. at 566.
234. Id.
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might consist of the removal of the testamentary power of appointment
from the terms of the trust.
23 5
Although the court in Hatch relied upon its inherent equitable
power to appoint a guardian ad litem,236 several jurisdictions, including
California, have enacted statutory authorization for such appoint-
ment.237 California Code of Civil Procedure section 373.5 provides that
a class of unborn or unascertained persons having a legal or equitable
interest in property may be conclusively represented by a guardian ad
litem appointed by the court.
238
The guardian ad litem device espoused in Hatch and authorized by
statute in California should not be regarded as a total panacea for settlors
and other living beneficiaries who desire early termination or modifica-
tion of a trust. The guardian ad litem acts in a fiduciary capacity and
must actively safeguard the interests of the represented class. 239 "The
representation by the guardian must be real and not merely formal.'" 24°
The guardian cannot simply consent to a trust termination or modifica-
tion that'adversely affects the interests of the unborn or unascertained
class members. Some corresponding benefit to the class must be forth-
coming. 241 In the absence of some such benefit, the consent by the
guardian will be deemed ineffectual.
242
The quid pro quo requirement is not necessarily an insurmountable
hurdle. In cases where the settlor/beneficiary seeks only modification or
partial termination, the requirement may be fairly easy to meet. In cases
235. Id. The settlor ultimately followed the suggestions of the court of appeal and secured
the appointment of a guardian ad litem who consented to the proposed modification. The
modification was subsequently approved by the district court. Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 284
F. Supp. 396 (D.D.C. 1968).
236. Hatch, 361 F.2d at 565-66.
237. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 373.5 (West 1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 22, § 6
(1959); MD. ANN. CODE RULES OF COURT ch. 1100, Rule V79 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 203, § 17 (West 1958); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 27.3178(212) (1947). English
law allows the court itself to consent on behalf of unborn beneficiaries to the termination or
modification of a trust if the court determines that such action would be advantageous to the
unborn beneficiaries. 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 53, § 1 (1958). See generally Trusts: Revocation: Doc-
trine of Worthier Title vs. the Use of Guardians Ad Litem, 41 CONN. B.J. 154, 160-63 (1967)
(court appointment of guardians ad litem).
238. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 373.5 (West 1973). This statute was enacted in 1949 as a
partial codification of the virtual representation doctrine. Wogman v. Wells Fargo Bank &
Union Trust Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 657, 666, 267 P.2d 423, 429 (1954); 7 B. WrrIKIN, SUM-
MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Trusts, § 122, at 5481 (8th ed. 1974).
239. Note, supra note 212, at 744-45; 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1552, 1554, 1558 (1966).
240. Estate of Leonardini v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 9, 17,
280 P.2d 81, 87 (1955).
241. Id.; Wogman, 123 Cal. App. 2d at 666, 267 P.2d at 429.
242. Leonardini, 131 Cal. App. 2d at 17-18, 280 P.2d at 87-88.
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such as Hatch, in which the settlor originally had retained a power of
appointment, renunciation of the power probably would be sufficient.
Other possibilities include the transfer of additional assets to the corpus
or the agreement to leave additional property to the settlor's heirs.
2 43
When total termination of the trust is sought, however, the problem be-
comes more difficult. Total termination necessarily entails the elimina-
tion of all beneficial interests, including those represented by the
guardian. Whatever quid pro quo is given must be commensurate with
the value of the estate the beneficiaries would have received in the ab-
sence of termination. 244 If the settlor has placed the bulk of his assets in
the trust he now seeks to terminate, the problem is acute, and termina-
tion is virtually impossible.245 If, however, the settlor has the good for-
tune to hold a testamentary power of appointment over the assets of
another trust, he may be in luck. In Moxley v. Title Insurance & Trust
Co.,246 Justice Traynor, in dissent, suggested that the beneficiary's exer-
cise of a power of appointment over a trust fund established by her father
in favor of the unborn beneficiaries under the trust established by her
mother might be an adequate quid pro quo for the termination of the
mother's trust. The value of the former trust fund apparently greatly
exceeded the latter. The majority opinion, however, did not discuss this
issue.
Another possible solution to the quid pro quo requirement would be
to recognize nonpecuniary factors, such as familial devotion, as a substi-
tute for consideration. Although the fiduciary responsibilities of guardi-
anship generally would preclude such substitutes, at least one jurisdiction
appears to authorize a nonpecuniary quid pro quo.247
Although the guardian ad litem concept has some drawbacks, par-
ticularly for those seeking termination, it has proved useful on occasion
and should be retained as one mechanism for alleviating certain trust
termination and modification situations. Because of its inherent limita-
tions, however, consideration should be given to possible statutory modi-
fication of the beneficiary consent requirement, discussed in the next
section.
243. 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1557, 1558-59 (1966); see 42 WASH. L. REV. 919, 921-22 (1967).
244. Note, supra note 212, at 748-49.
245. Id.
246. 27 Cal. 2d 457, 476-77, 165 P.2d 15, 25 (1946) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
247. Legislation in Wisconsin allows for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to repre-
sent unborn or unascertained beneficiaries and provides that "[a] guardian ad litem for such
beneficiary may rely on general family benefit accruing to living members of the beneficiary's
family as a basis for approving a revocation, modification or termination of a trust or any part
thereof." Whs. STAT. ANN. § 701.12(2) (West 1981).
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Statutory Amendment of the Consent Requirement
As noted above, problems arise when the settlor has created an ir-
revocable trust, reserving an income interest in himself for life and di-
recting that on his death the principal be distributed to his heirs or next
of kin, and he later wishes to terminate this arrangement because of fi-
nancial need or other reasons. California should statutorily reinstate a
limited form of the worthier title doctrine to alleviate the problems en-
gendered by this situation. Such legislation might simply restate the
common-law rule that an irrevocable trust may be terminated upon the
consent of the settlor and all beneficially interested persons, but should
then provide that a gift or limitation in favor of the "heirs" or "next of
kin" of the settlor does not create a beneficial interest.248 The rationale
underlying this recommendation is that the settlor's primary purpose in
establishing such a trust is to provide lifetime benefits to himself, thus
"he probably did not intend his determination of the ultimate objects of
his generosity to be final."'24 9 There appears to be no public policy justifi-
cation for not allowing the settlor to change his mind under these limited
circumstances. 250 Such legislation should apply only when the designa-
tion involves the term "heirs" or "next of kin;" it should not apply when
the limitation is in favor of the children, issue, or descendants of the
settlor.251 Furthermore, the statute should not apply to a limitation in
favor of the heirs or next of kin of someone other that the settlor.2 52 In
these latter situations, in which the class includes unborn or unascer-
tained persons, the only mechanism for termination or modification
248. Similar legislation was enacted in New York in 1951 as a response to the volume of
litigation spawned by Doctor v. Hughes. 1951 N.Y. Laws 729 (codified at N.Y. EST. POWER &
TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.9 (McKinney 1981)). For a discussion of the revised New York statute,
see Niles, Trusts and Administration, ANN. SUR. AM. LAW 570, 575-76 (1952); Scott, supra
note 174, at 621-23; Verrall, supra note 181, at 386-87. Oklahoma has adopted a similar provi-
sion. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.41 (West 1971).
249. Scott, supra note 174, at 623.
250. Such legislation should be limited to the case in which the settlor has provided that
the trust income be paid to himself for life, and on his death, the principal is to be distributed
to his heirs or next of kin. It is recommended, however, that the statute be applied whether or
not the settlor has reserved a testmentary power of appointment. It should be noted that the
proposed legislation may have tax consequences which should be explored before such a stat-
ute is adopted. See Johanson, Reversions, Remainders, and the Doctrine of Worthier Title, 45
TEX. L. REv. 1, 16-27 (1966).
251. The latter terms are more clearly indicative of an intent to make a gift to the de-
scribed class of persons. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 127 com-
ment b.
252. In this situation, the settlor is not manifesting any intent to retain control over the
property himself, and the common inference (in the absence of the Rule in Shelley's Case) is
that a class gift was intended. Id.
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should be the appointment of a guardian ad litem or the doctrine of vir-
tual representation.
Moreover, legislation should be enacted to alleviate the "fertile
octogenerian" problem previously discussed. 25 3 Under the existing Cali-
fornia case law there is a conclusive presumption of fertility, that is, a
woman is presumed capable of bearing children as long as she lives.
254
The presumption originated in cases involving the rule against perpetu-
ities, with the courts refusing to admit evidence of a woman's sterility to
validate the interests otherwise too remote.255 The rationale proffered for
the rule was that such evidence was too conjectural, too uncertain.
256
Advances in medical science, however, have encouraged a number of ju-
risdictions to abandon the conclusive presumption and to allow expert
medical testimony on the issue of fertility vel non.257 In the context of
trust termination, most modem courts take the view that absent dispute
about the possibility of bearing children, termination should be permit-
ted.258 The only reasons given in support of retaining the conclusive pre-
sumption are the "indelicacy" or "indecency" of the proffered evidence;
the inducement for sterilization for the purpose of terminating trusts that
would exist without the rule; and the uncertainty of such evidence.
259
The first reason is "absurdly prudish ' '260 and the second "utterly insub-
stantial. '261 As to the third, "the difficulty may be taken care of by a
rule requiring that the proof of sterility, to be sufficient, must be clear
and convincing. ' 262 Although the cases that have arisen in California
have involved the alleged sterility of a female beneficiary, there is no rea-
son why the proposed statute and its operation should not be "gender
253. See supra text accompanying notes 202-11.
254. Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust & Say. Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 180-84, 187 P. 425, 426-28
(1920).
255. The seminal case is Jee v. Audldy, 1 Cox 324 (1787), holding that a 70 year old
woman was conclusively presumed capable of bearing children. The court's knowledge about
these matters was derived primarily from the Old Testament. Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic
Age. The Sperm Bank and the Fertile Decedent, 48 A.B.A. J. 942, 942 (1962).
256. Turrentine, supra note 203, at 27 n.146.
257. See, e.g., In re Bassett Estate, 104 N.H. 504, 190 A.2d 415 (1963); see also REsTAT-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS, supra note 2, § 340 comment e; 4 A. Scorr, supra note 3,
§ 340.1, at 2714.
258. 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 340.1, at 2714.
259. Id.; Turrentine, supra note 203, at 27 n.146.
260. 4 A. SCOTr, supra note 3, § 340.1, at 2714.
261. Turrentine, supra note 203, at 27. "The danger that a woman would submit to such
an operation for such a reason [trust termination] is surely negligible .... 4 A. Scoyr,
supra note 3, § 340.1, at 2714.
262. Turrentine, supra note 203, at 27. Moreover, even when the evidence of infertility is
not conclusive, protection of possible unborn beneficiaries could be achieved by the use of a
bond. 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 340.1, at 2714-15.
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neutral. " 263
Conclusion
This Commentary has surveyed the existing California law in the
area of trust revocation and termination, and has delineated particular
problems that should be resolved or alleviated. Various proposals for
reform have been suggested. These proposals may be summarized as
follows:
1. Revision of California Civil Code section 2280 to limit the method of
revocation by the settlor to the means specified in the trust instrument or
to a writing delivered to the trustee during the settlor's lifetime.
2. Limitation of the material purpose doctrine to spendthrift trusts.
3. Adoption of a modified version of the worthier title doctrine to allow
termination by the settlor despite a limitation in favor of his "heirs" or
"next of kin."
4. Expansion of the utility of the guardian ad litem concept to allow
nonpecuniary consideration for consent.
5. Abolition of the conclusive presumption of fertility.
The adoption of these proposals will provide greater flexibility to the
creators and beneficiaries of trusts. Admittedly, these suggestions for re-
form are weighted in favor of living settlors and beneficiaries. Tipping
the scales in favor of the living should be a conscious policy decision:
The reason. . . is a simple one of human relationships, implicit in the
principle that human laws, and all other temporal things, are for the
living; not for the dead or those not yet in being, if to hold otherwise
would result in injustice to living persons. Because parties are not in
being, and therefore cannot be brought before the tribunal, is not a
sufficient reason for a court to stand by, helpless and impotent, when
rights of living persons, in ordinary common sense, ought to be
adjudicated. 264
263. Courts in other jurisdictions have admitted evidence of male infertility. See, e.g.,
Scott Trust, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 66 (1955); Krewson Trust, 6 Pa. Fiduc. 54 (1955); see also 14 U.
PiTr. L. REv. 452, 454 (1953) (there should be no distinction between men and women con-
cerning the incapacity of having issue).
264. Mabry v. Scott, 51 Cal. App. 2d 245, 252-53, 124 P.2d 659, 663 (1942).
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